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Federalism has moved to the forefront of constitutional analysis in recent
years as a narrow majority of the Supreme Court has begun to rein in
congressional assertions of authority to legislate in areas viewed as beyond the
constitutional grant of power to the federal government.' One means for
curtailing congressional authority is by enforcing limits on the Commerce
Clause, perhaps the broadest of Congress's regulatory powers. In United States
v. Lopez,2 the Court sent a "constitutional wake-up call"3 making clear that it
would no longer acquiesce in every congressional enactment purportedly
adopted as an exercise of the commerce power when it invalidated the Gun-Free
School Zones Act. This marked the first time since 1936 that the Court
overturned a statute because it exceeded Congress's authority to regulate
interstate commerce. Lopez reiterated that the Commerce Clause provides only
a limited grant of legislative power-despite the broad language used in opinions
such as Wickard v. Filburn-that reflects the fundamental constitutional
principle of federalism: the Constitution "withhold[s] from Congress a plenary
police power that would authorize enactment of every type of legislation."6
Five years after Lopez, in United States v. Morrison,7 the Court applied its
Commerce Clause analysis in striking down a provision of the Violence Against
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. Copyright © 2003 Peter
J. Henning. The author appreciates the assistance provided by the Wayne State
University Law School Works-in-Progress Program, and especially the suggestions of
Bob Sedler, Kingsley Browne, Erica Eisinger, Jon Weinberg, John Rothchild, Mike
McIntyre, Dave Moran, Vince Weliman, and John Dolan.
1. See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle?, 11l HARV. L. REV. 2180,2181 (1998) ("The constitutional law of federalism-
based constraints on the federal government has risen phoenix-like from the ashes of
post-New Deal enthusiasm for the exercise of national power."); cf Jesse H. Choper &
John C. Yoo, The Scope of the Commerce Clause after Morrison, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REv. 843, 844 (2000) ("Federalism has become the defining issue of the Rehnquist
Court.").
2. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
3. Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady
Path ": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1447, 1484
(1995).
4. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
5. 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (applying aggregate effect on commerce test in
upholding regulation of noncommercial, intrastate farming of wheat).
6. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.
7. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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Women Act ("VAWA") that created a federal civil damages action for gender-
motivated violence. The Court rejected the extensive congressional findings8
concerning the economic impact of such misconduct as the constitutional basis
for the legislation, asserting that the judiciary has an independent duty to enforce
the limits on congressional power under the federalist structure of the
Constitution.9  The Court held that federalism constrains the federal
government's authority to reach certain areas already subject to state control
because "[t]he Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national
and what is truly local."
The Court's recent reliance on federalism as an independent limitation on
congressional power to legislate in areas that infringe on state sovereignty has
a significant impact on the application of federal criminal laws to misconduct
traditionally viewed as a matter of local concern. Federal statutes reach a wide
8. See id. at 628-31 & 629-31 nn.3-8 (Souter, J.,'dissenting) (distinguishing the
case from Lopez based on "the mountain of data assembled by Congress, here showing
the effects of violence against women on interstate commerce").
9. Id. at 616 n.7 ("No doubt the political branches have a role in interpreting and
applying the Constitution, but ever since Marbury this Court has remained the ultimate
expositor of the constitutional text."). The majority rejected Justice Souter's argument
in a dissenting opinion that the political process was the only constitutional restraint on
congressional enactments under the commerce power. The Court stated:
[Justice Souter's] assertion that, from Gibbons on, public opinion has been
the only restraint on the congressional exercise of the commerce power is true
only insofar as it contends that political accountability is and has been the
only limit on Congress' exercise of the commerce power within that power's
outer bounds. As the language surrounding that relied upon by Justice
SOUTER makes clear, Gibbons did not remove from this Court the authority
to define that boundary.
Id.
10. Id. at 617. Since Lopez, the Court has further limited Congress's authority vis-
A-vis the states by prohibiting suits under the Eleventh Amendment against states for
violation of federal statutes: See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S.Ct.
1864, 1868 (2002) (barring administrative proceeding against a state agency before the
Federal Maritime Commission); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000)
(Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 held not to apply to states); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,630 (1999) (Patent
and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act held not to apply to the states);
City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (striking down Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 on the ground that Congress did not have the authority under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to define rights applicable against the states);
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (striking down Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act on the ground that the Commerce Clause does not give Congress
the authority "to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal
jurisdiction" by the Eleventh Amendment).
[Vol. 68
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variety of crimes-such as car-jacking," murder-for-hire schemes," the use of
violence to block access to abortion clinics,"3 and even armed robberies of
individuals 4-that are virtually identical to offenses normally subject to
prosecution by state authorities. Because there are no federal common law
crimes,15 the federal government's ability to punish misconduct is limited by the
requirement that Congress regulate under one of its enumerated powers in
enacting criminal legislation. The Morrison Court expressed concern that the
extension of federal authority through VAWA to rape, a common law felony
prosecuted in every state, went beyond Congress's legislative power because "we
can think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied
the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of
violent crime and vindication of its victims."' 6
As Morrison exemplifies, the Court's reinvigoration of federalism as a limit
on congressional authority affects the application of federal criminal statutes. 7
Even before Lopez, academic commentary and the federal judiciary questioned
11. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2000) ("Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious
bodily harm takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in
interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force and
violence or by intimidation .... ).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (2000) ("Use of interstate commerce facilities in the
commission of murder-for-hire.").
13. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000) (Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act)
("Whoever by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures,
intimidates, or interferes with ... any person because that person is or has been...
obtaining or providing reproductive health services .... ).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2000) (Hobbs Act) ("Whoever in any way or degree
obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in
commerce, by robbery .. "); see United States v. Peterson, 236 F.3d 848, 857 (7th Cir.
2001) (overturning conviction under the Hobbs Act for robbery of local drug dealer for
failure to establish commerce element).
15. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812) ("The
legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to
it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence."); Ben Rosenberg,
The Growth of Federal Criminal Common Law, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 193, 194 (2002)
("That all federal criminal law derives from statutes is a cornerstone of the federal
criminal jurisprudence."). Mr. Rosenberg argues that by adopting open-ended statutes,
Congress effectively permits federal courts to create a type of common law for federal
offenses, although the foundation remains statutory rather than the pure common law
development of criminal offenses. Id.
16. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000).
17. See Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun
Penalties: Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51
DUKE L.J. 1641, 1646 (2002) ("Lopez and Morrison provide a [constitutional] doctrine
with which the Supreme Court can prune back federal criminal jurisdiction, particularly
in cases involving conduct the Court deems non-economic.").
2003]
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the policy of extending federal jurisdiction to a host of crimes that were-and
remain-traditionally within the purview of state and local prosecutors and
courts.'" The Supreme Court, in Lopez and Morrison, added a constitutional
dimension to this critique by raising a significant question regarding Congress's
authority to adopt provisions extending federal authority to criminal misconduct
historically prosecuted by the states.19
Although defendants have been largely unsuccessful in challenging the
constitutionality of statutes on Commerce Clause grounds since Lopez,2" some
lower courts have accepted constitutional challenges to the particular application
of federal statutes to ostensibly local crimes as violative of federalism principles.
In United States v. McCoy,2 the Ninth Circuit held ihat a provision of the child
18. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN
FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 24 (1995) ("[C]riminal activity should be prosecuted in a
federal court only in those instances in which state court prosecution is not appropriate
or where federal interests are paramount."); Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief:
The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1172 (1995)
("Federal duplication of state criminal law unduly burdens the federal justice system,
which is ill-equipped to supplant local law enforcement."); William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 517 (2001) ("Federal
criminal law probably covers more conduct-and a good deal more innocuous
conduct-than any state criminal code."). But see Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm
Federalism in CriminalLaw, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1541, 1555 (2002) ("[T]he threat of federal
encroachment on state criminal-justice systems is small. Not only will the total
percentage of federal criminal-law actions per state criminal-law filings remain small, but
most of these federal prosecutions will continue to be filed in the same few
areas-immigration violations, interstate and international drug offenses, and complex
white-collar offenses.").
19. In an article written shortly after the Court's decision in Lopez, I predicted that
"the effect of Lopez on federal criminal law is likely to be minimal" because Congress
was not apt to make the mistake of passing a statute that did not contain a commerce
element. Peter J. Henning, Foreword: Statutory Interpretation and the Federalization
of Criminal Law, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1169 (1996). The civil damages
provision of VAWA did not contain such an element of proof, although the criminal
provisions require proof of interstate movement. While Lopez, standing alone, was not
likely to have much effect on federal criminal law, Morrison's advancement of
federalism as a possible separate limitation on congressional power to adopt regulations,
including criminal laws, can have a much greater effect than the more limited Commerce
Clause analysis in Lopez. I am not sure if I stand corrected, but my prediction was not
particularly prescient, as demonstrated by this Article.
20. Diane McGimsey, Comment, The Commerce Clause and Federalism after
Lopez and Morrison: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90
CAL. L. REv. 1675, 1678 (2002) ("[L]ower courts have consistently rejected Lopez- and
Morrison-based challenges to Congress's ability to enact statutes under its Commerce
Clause power.").
21. No. 01-50495, 2003 WL 1343642 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2003).
[Vol. 68
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pornography statute was "unconstitutional as applied to simple interstate
possession of a visual depiction," even though the government had introduced
sufficient proof of all the elements of the offense, including the interstate
commerce element contained in the statute.22 Similarly, in United States v.
Garcia,23 a district court dismissed a prosecution under the Violent Crime in Aid
of Racketeering24 statute because the provision was unconstitutional as applied
to a murder that did not involve any obvious interstate nexus. In United States
v. Hickman23 and United States v. McFarland,6 the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc,
twice divided evenly on the issue of the constitutionality of a prosecution under
the Hobbs Act that involved a series of "purely local" armed robberies. In
Hickman, the dissenting judges argued that Lopez and Morrison required
reversal of the convictions because "[t]he ad hoc and random use of the Hobbs
Act to prosecute local robberies masks the dramatic reach of federal power. 27
The Supreme Court's assertion in Morrison regarding the constitutional
"distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local"28 has provided
added impetus for defendants to dispute the federal government's authority to
enforce laws when the offense involves conduct that historically was not subject
to federal prosecution.29
Invoking federalism as an independent principle to limit the federal
government's authority to prosecute crimes that state and local authorities
22. Id. at *1 (emphasis added). The statute, 18 U.S.C. Section 2252(a)(4)(B),
prohibits possession of a visual depiction of a minor "engaging in sexually explicit
conduct" if it "was produced using materials which have been mailed or so shipped or
transported" in interstate commerce. The government introduced evidence that the
camera and film used to take the picture were shipped in interstate commerce. Id. at *2.
23. 68 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (2000).
25. 179 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 1999).
26. 311 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2002).
27. Hickman, 179 F.3d at 243 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). In McFarland, the
dissentingj udges, in an opinion by Circuit Judge Garwood, asserted that "[t]he evidence
does not reflect any particular, concrete effect on interstate commerce that in fact
actually resulted from any of the four robberies." McFarland, 311 F.3d at 393
(Garwood, J., dissenting).
28. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000).
29. See United States v. Ballinger, 312 F.3d 1264, 1276 (1 1th Cir. 2002) (The
Court overturned the convictions because "[w]hile Ballinger's crimes are heinous, they
are state crimes. To allow the government to prosecute him for these arsons would be
to obliterate the distinction between national and local authority that undergirds our
federal system of government."); cf United States v. Watts, 256 F.3d 630, 631 (7th Cir.
2001) (The defendant "pleaded guilty to both counts, but reserved the right to pursue on
appeal a line of argument popular with criminal defendants these days: whether
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ordinarily handle certainly has a superficial appeal.3" Lopez and Morrison both
refer to a seemingly inviolable realm of state authority that appears to include
state and local control-perhaps to the exclusion of the federal
government-over the prosecution of "local" crimes. The Court's federalism
analysis gives the impression of separate spheres of authority over the criminal
law that relegates Congress to legislating only in those areas that are obviously
"national" in scope.3 The notion of mutually exclusive spheres hinted at in
Lopez and Morrison-at least with respect to criminal statutes--overstates the
role of federalism in demarcating the authority of the national and state
governments.3 2
The Founders certainly envisioned that federal crimes could encompass
conduct also subject to state prosecution. For example, the Constitution
explicitly provides for federal prosecution for treason, but does not exclude state
prosecutions for the same conduct.33 The Double Jeopardy Clause reflects the
30. See Adam H. Kurland, First Principles ofAmerican Federalism and the Nature
of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J. 1, 6 (1996) ("Federal defendants
charged with acts of local political corruption often contend that such prosecutions
offend federalism and related Tenth Amendment principles.").
31. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist
Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 429, 431 (2002) ("By limiting
Congress's regulatory capacity, decisions such as UnitedStates v. Lopez preserve spheres
in which state and local governments are the exclusive lawgivers.") (footnote omitted).
32. See Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard
of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 87-88 (2001) ("Certainly the graveyard of failed
distinctions that these efforts left behind-'commerce' versus 'police' regulation,
'inherentlynational' versus 'inherently local' matters, 'manufacturing' or 'mining' versus
'commerce,' 'direct' versus 'indirect' effects-does not speak well for thejudicial ability
to develop doctrinal limits on national powerthat are at once meaningful and workable.")
(footnotes omitted); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn 't, 96
MICH. L. REV. 813, 938 (1998) ("[T]he Court has relied ...on palpably untrue
statements that the federal and state governments operate in separate, independent, and
mutually exclusive spheres ."); Kurland, supra note 30, at 61 ("[T]he substantive federal
criminal law was potentially very broad in scope. It necessarily would overlap with state
criminal jurisdiction to varying, and significant, degrees. This much was accepted. So
much for a notion of a rigid dual federalism and the demarcation of exclusive spheres of
jurisdiction in the criminal law context."); Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism:
United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REv. 125,206 ("There is no [such] thing out there
called 'tradition' that lower courts can look to to sort outjust what objects of regulation
should be federal and which local. And because there is nothing out there to guide the
courts, courts will be guided to different conclusions."); Ernest A. Young, State
Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 27 (Enclaves
of exclusive state authority "are exceptionally difficult to sustain because they frequently
overlap with areas in which federal authority is unquestioned.").
33. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. I ("Treason against the United States, shall consist
(Vol. 68
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possibility of federal and state prosecution for the "same offence.""4 The
Constitution also provides exclusive federal control over the laws of the Federal
District and the territories." The First Congress adopted criminal laws to
implement the enumerated powers provided by the Constitution. It enacted
statutes to reach misconduct affecting the interests of the federal government that
did not come within any specific constitutional grant of legislative power."
Thus, while the states obviously retain authority to prosecute crimes under their
general police power, the federal government has concurrent authority to protect
federal interests that is not limited to a small realm of misconduct over which
such authority is explicitly authorized by the Constitution.
It is a misguided view of federalism that the federal government somehow
invades the sovereignty of the states by pursuing criminal prosecutions for
certain types of conduct already subject to prosecution by state and local
authorities. The source of that misunderstanding is the Supreme Court's broad
language in Lopez and Morrison asserting that matters traditionally viewed as
"local"-including the prosecution of violent crimes normally brought in state
and local courts-are reserved in some way from regulation by the national
government. Under this approach, federalism becomes not just an aspect of
constitutional analysis, but also a new type of defense in federal prosecutions.
Some lower courts, encouraged by off-handed references in Supreme Court
opinions about the limiting effect of federalism on congressional authority to
reach certain types of crimes, have taken that cue to reject the federal
only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and
Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two
Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court."); see Kurland, supra
note 30, at 44 ("[B]y the rejection of the proposal [at the Constitutional Convention] that
would have provided the United States with the 'sole' power over treason, the states
retained the power to define and punish treasonous activities themselves."); Brandon L.
Bigelow, Note, The Commerce Clause and Criminal Law, 41 B.C. L. REV. 913, 932
(2000) ("The states and federal government thus shared the power to prosecute treason.").
34. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.").
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 ("Authority over all Places purchased" or ceded).
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6 (counterfeiting); U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10
(offenses).
37. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the
First Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. CHi. L. REV. 775, 833 (1994) ("Clearly the First
Congress did not view the list of topics of federal criminal law as implicitly negating
authority to create other offenses when that was necessary and proper to the exercise of
some other explicit federal power."); Kurland, supra note 30, at 59 ("Congress
understood early on that it possessed a broad constitutional federal criminal law
authority. It relied on the Necessary and Proper Clause, and other inherent attributes of
sovereignty and self-protection to determine the necessary means for protecting important
interests that were appropriately within the domain of the federal government.").
2003]
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government's power to pursue a particular case even when the statute itself is a
proper exercise of Congress's power to regulate. 8 This application of federalism
creates a new form of judicial supervisory authority to invoke a vague
constitutional limitation-one not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution-to
limit the national government's power to pursue criminal prosecutions. The
effect of an exercise of such a supervisory authority, under the rubric of deciding
an as-applied constitutional challenge to the prosecution, is that it allows the
court to dismiss the charge without regard to the defendant's guilt. The basis for
the dismissal is that the prosecution exceeds what, in the judge's view, is the type
of crime the federal government should prosecute under an otherwise valid
statute.39
This approach, however, misconstrues the role of federalism in apportioning
power between different layers of government. Federalism is not an additional
limitation on federal prosecutors that prohibits particular prosecutions for
violations of statutes because of a perceived invasion of the states' sovereignty.
38. See, e.g., United States v. McCoy, No. 01-50495, 2003 WL 1343642, at *14
(9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2003) ("Nothing in current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, as
proclaimed by the Supreme Court, provides support for the application of Section
2252(a)(4)(B) to McCoy and others similarly situated whose non-commercial, non-
economic possession of a prohibited photograph is entirely intrastate in nature."); United
States v. McFarland, 311 F.3d 376, 409 (5th Cir. 2002) (Garwood, J., dissenting)
(dissenting from affirmance by an equally-divided court of convictions for violations of
the Hobbs Act involving robberies of local stores because "the instant robberies fall
within Lopez category three, and for that reason they are within the Commerce Clause
power only if they 'substantially' affect interstate commerce. Individually considered,
it is clear that none of them do."); United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325, 332 (6th Cir.
2001) (reversing conviction for possession of child pornography, but not declaring law
unconstitutional, because "[the defendant's] activity was not of a type demonstrated
substantially to be connected or related to interstate commerce on the facts of this case");
United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 231 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Higginbotham,
J., dissenting) (dissenting from affirmance by an equally-divided court of convictions for
violations of the Hobbs Act involving robberies of local outlets of national restaurant
chains because "the Hobbs Act prosecutions exceeded Congress's authority"); United
States v. Raybom, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031 (W.D. Tenn. 200 1) (dismissing indictment
for arson of a church because application of the statute to this case "would be an
unconstitutional extension of Congress's commerce power"); United States v. Garcia, 68
F. Supp. 2d 802, 811 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (dismissing indictment under VCAR statute
because "[a] stronger and more substantial connection or impact on interstate commerce
is required"); United States v. McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d 176, 189 (D. Mass. 1998)
(dismissing indictment for bribery of a police officer because the conduct was "not
'related to a legitimate national problem' because it is not directed towards protecting the
integrity of federal funds").
39. See, e.g., McCoy, 2003 WL 1343642, at *15 ("If punishment for the conduct
in which McCoy engaged is desirable and lawful, it is the state that must seek to attain
that result, not the federal government. The statute is unconstitutional as applied.").
[Vol. 68
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In Lopez and Morrison, the Court relied on federalism as a rationale for holding
that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting
statutes that dealt with criminal conduct falling within the traditional purview of
the states. It was unclear whether federalism added anything to the Court's
analysis of congressional authority to regulate commerce, and it appeared to
serve largely as a policy justification for declaring the statutes unconstitutional
rather than as an independent principle limiting Congress's legislative
authority."
Even if federalism constrains the legislative power from reaching beyond
the limitations of the Commerce Clause, it does not equally restrict the Executive
Branch in pursuing criminal charges when federal prosecutors apply an
otherwise valid law to criminal conduct traditionally within the ambit of state and
local authority. If federalism limits more than just congressional authority to
enact criminal statutes, then a defendant can raise a constitutional challenge in
any federal criminal prosecution and seek dismissal of the charge because the
prosecution allegedly violated federalism principles. The issue, then, is whether
federalism's structural protections of state authority limit the power of the
Executive Branch to apply the law in a particular case.
Part II of this Article discusses the Supreme Court's reinvigoration of
federalism as a limit on congressional power to adopt legislation that disrupts the
balance between federal and state interests. While the Court in Lopez and
Morrison sought a principled articulation of federalism as a limit on
congressional power to regulate, its language conveyed an impression that there
are certain types of crimes that can be designated as "local" and, therefore,
reserved exclusively to the states. Part III analyzes the development of the
federal criminal law, and how the Supreme Court has rejected federalism
challenges to criminal statutes that were duplicative of existing state and local
crimes, supporting the position that congressional authority is not limited by the
police power of the states to punish similar forms of misconduct. Part IV
reviews the status of constitutional challenges to prosecutions on federalism
grounds, and discusses how the usual view of constitutional adjudication as
primarily involving "as-applied" challenges is inappropriate when the issue
involves the power of Congress to adopt a statute and the limits on its power
under the principle of federalism. This Article then considers cases in the lower
courts that have taken the Court's recent federalism analysis as a signal that the
judiciary must police federal prosecutors by examining whether a particular case
involves a "national" interest in the prosecution or whether it is merely a "local"
40. Cf Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903, 928 (1994) ("[N]o Supreme Court decision
has ever rested on [the Tenth Amendment's] language, and even federalism's most
enthusiastic proponents, such as Justice O'Connor, cast their arguments for federalism
in functional, or policy terms.").
2003]
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crime that is somehow barred by the Constitution from any federal involvement.
I argue that federalism does not provide a basis for courts to exercise a
"'chancellor's foot' veto"'" to bar a prosecution on federalism grounds when the
statute is a valid exercise of one of Congress's enumerated powers.
II. THE FEDERALISM REVIVAL
Federalism is a concept that defies easy description, and the Supreme Court
is closely divided on how much it limits congressional authority to enact
legislation. Federalism is neither a specific grant of power to the states nor a
denial of any particular authority to the federal government. It is a structural
device viewed as one of the fundamental protections embedded in the
Constitution, although "[f]ederalism ... is not a rule from which judgments can
follow inexorably, without the imposition of contested value choices." '42
41. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973) ("[T]he defense of
entrapment... was not intended to give the federal judiciary a 'chancellor's foot' veto
over law enforcement practices of which it did not approve."). The Delaware Supreme
Court summarized the problem with an equity jurisprudence based solely on the
Chancellor's view of what is and is not permissible:
We are mindful of the elasticity inherent in equity jurisprudence and the
traditional desirability in certain equity cases of measuring conduct by the
"conscience of the court" and disapproving conduct which offends or shocks
that conscience. Yet one must be wary of equity jurisprudence which takes
on a random or ad hoc quality.
Equity is a rougish [sic] thing. For Law we have to measure,
know what to trust to; Equity is according to the conscience of
him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is
Equity. 'Tis all one as if they should make the standard for the
measure we call a 'foot' a Chancellor's foot; what an uncertain
measure this would this be! One Chancellor has a long foot,
another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot. 'Tis the same
thing in the Chancellor's conscience.
Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1378 n.17 (Del. 1993) (quoting John Selden,
"Equity, " Table-Talk, 1689 in THE QUOTABLE LAWYER (David S. Shrager & Elizabeth
Frost eds., 1986)).
42. Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True Federalism, 110 YALE L.
J. 829, 875 (2001) (reviewing EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000)); see Jackson, supra note 1,
at 2215 ([D]efining the 'it' of federalism restraints remains acutely difficult. Although
the Constitution does provide some quite explicit constitutional protections for the
interests of the states, standards limiting national legislation in substantive matters
claimed to be 'reserved' to the states do not emerge clearly from the naked text of
Congress's enumerated powers."); Young, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 32, at
34 ("Federalism doctrine is an incompletely theorized, common law sort of creature, and
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Federalism is an issue of congressional power to enact regulations that
operate on the states directly in their role as sovereigns, and not one of whether
the federal government can exercise its power over individuals. Since the
Court's decisions in Lopez and Morrison, however, some lower courts have
asserted their authority to dismiss federal prosecutions because the particular
application of the statute exceeded the limits of congressional power which
federalism imposed, even if the statute itself was a valid exercise of legislative
authority. For example, in United States v. McCormack,43 a federal district court
dismissed corruption charges because the violation was not related to a
"legitimate national problem" that permitted the prosecution of an essentially
local crime. In United States v. Rayborn," another federal district court
dismissed arson charges because the prosecution "would be an unconstitutional
extension of Congress's commerce power."45 These decisions relied on the
Court's assertion that federalism places an external limit on the power of
Congress to regulate certain types of conduct, and that if the crime appears to be
something that is "truly local," then the court can step in to block the prosecution
by the federal government without regard to the constitutionality of the statute.
Unlike the federalism decisions that consider the scope of congressional
power, lower courts that dismiss charges without invalidating the underlying
statute apply federalism as a type of ad hoc limit on the authority of federal
prosecutors to charge crimes that come within the literal terms of the statute.
The issue is not that the government cannot prove the crime, but whether federal
prosecutors can pursue the charge, or instead it should come within the exclusive
authority of the states. Of course, a federal court cannot direct a state to exercise
its sovereign authority to pursue an individual prosecution, so the only remedy
available is dismissal of the federal charges. Under this view, federalism is a
general limit on federal authority to prosecute crimes, a limit that will not be
immediately apparent without ajudicial declaration that the conduct falls outside
the interests of the national government. This application is not consistent with
the Supreme Court's approach to federalism because it misconstrues how
federalism operates as a limit on congressional authority to enact regulations
under the Constitution, but does not limit the Executive's power to enforce
otherwise valid laws.
for this reason it is unrealistic to expect that doctrine to be perfectly coherent or
strategic.").
43. 31 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D. Mass. 1998).
44. 138 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (W.D. Tenn. 2001).
45. Id. at 1032.
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A. Federalism as an Anti-Commandeering Rule
Law review authors note that federalism has, in the past decade, become a
"hot" topic, odd as that may sound." Federalism never really left the scene of
constitutional debate, despite the effort of a narrow majority of the Court to
consign it to a type ofjudicial oblivion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority.47 In Garcia, a narrow majority of the Court overruled the
nine-year-old precedent of National League of Cities v. Usery4' that accepted
judicial authority under federalism to overturn legislation regulating the states
directly. In Garcia, the majority opinion asserted, "[W]e have no license to
employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when measuring
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. '49 Garcia advanced the
proposition that states' interests "are more properly protected by procedural
safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially
created limitations on federal power.""0 In dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist
accurately predicted that Garcia's hands-off approach would not last long."
The Court began its revival of federalism as a type of constitutional rule of
statutory construction in Gregory v. Ashcroft. 2 The Court's 5-4 decision in that
case held that the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") did
not prevent a state from enforcing a mandatory retirement provision for state
court judges. The Court discussed federalism's role as an independent limit on
congressional authority to regulate the states. Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion began by noting that "[a]s every schoolchild learns, our Constitution
establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal
Government."" This dual sovereignty did not necessarily prohibit federal action,
46. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism: An
Empirical Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV.
741, 741 (2000) ("Federalism is 'hot."'); Fallon, Jr., supra note 3 1, at 430 ("Law reviews
echo with discussion of whether the court has yet achieved, or is likely to effect, a
federalism 'revolution."').
47. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
48. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
49. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550.
50. Id. at 551.
51. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I do not think it incumbent on those of
us in dissent to spell out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in
time again command the support of a majority of this Court."); see also id. at 589
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I share Justice REHNQUIST'S belief that this Court will in
time again assume its constitutional responsibility.").
52. 501 U.S. 452 (1991); see Rubin & Feeley, supra note 40, at 903 ("A mere six
years after its brave declaration that it had swom off federalism for good [in Garcia], the
Supreme Court suffered a relapse [in Gregory v. Ashcrofl].").
53. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 457.
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because "Congress may legislate in areas traditionally regulated by the States,"
but any interference with the states in exercising their sovereignty may
impermissibly alter the balance between federal and state authority.54 To
determine whether the statute impermissibly overrode the states' authority, the
Court imposed a "plain statement rule" requiring that Congress make its intent
to regulate the states "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."55 The
Court held that the ADEA did not contain the requisite plain statement and,
therefore, did not protect the Missouri judges from the state's mandatory
retirement provision.
In Gregory, the Court couched its holding in terms of Garcia's approach to
federalism, asserting that its rule avoided "a potential constitutional problem" by
requiring that courts be "absolutely certain that Congress intended" to override
the states. The Court did not proscribe judicial review of legislation on
federalism grounds, however, as Garcia appeared to do, a point that portended
the future conflict regarding the role of federalism as an independent limit on
congressional authority.
In New York v. United States,56 the Court-again in a 5-4 decision-took
its first step toward reasserting federalism as a wide-ranging limit on
congressional authority to legislate by invalidating a provision of the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act because the Act impermissibly "commandeered"
the state legislatures. The Act's "take title" provision required states to enact
legislation to provide for the siting and financing of waste disposal facilities."
The Court began its federalism analysis with a very different approach from that
used in Garcia by emphasizing the importance of the judicial role in determining
the line between federal and state power, noting that this process "has given rise
to many of the Court's most difficult and celebrated cases."" The Constitution
reflects the limitations of the federal system in two ways: first, the federal
government has only those powers enumerated in the Constitution; second, the
Tenth Amendment reserves to the states those powers not transferred to the
national government.59 For the purpose of analyzing the validity of a statute, the
Court then stated that "in a case... involving the division of authority between
federal and state governments, the two inquiries are mirror images of each
other." Declaring that the Tenth Amendment is "essentially a tautology," the
Court stated that the federalism principle involved "understanding and applying
54. Id. at 460.
55. Id. (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
56. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 202le(d)(2)(c) (1991).
58. New York, 505 U.S. at 155.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
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the framework set forth in the Constitution" that was separate from the analysis
of the scope of any particular constitutional provision.6
The approach to federalism signaled in New York was that of a limitation
on congressional authority that is not rooted in the text of the Constitution so
much as it is in the Court's perception of the proper interaction between state and
federal authority. Federalism means that the line between the states and the
national government would be one largely subject to judicial exposition, with no
predictable guideposts or constitutional language to denote the scope of the
doctrine. The Court invalidated the "take title" provision in New York because
Congress does not have the power to commandeer the states to do the federal
government's bidding.6' Although the law came within congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause, the Court held that "the provision [was]
inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government established by the
Constitution."'62
Both Gregory v. Ashcroft and New York involved congressional action that
operated on the states directly. In New York, the Court noted that "[i]n providing
for a stronger central government, therefore, the Framers explicitly chose a
Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not
States." The federal system incorporates dual sovereignty to protect the states
as states from federal interference, as exemplified by Printz v. United States.6 a
In Printz, the Court invalidated the Brady Handgun Violence Protection
Act's requirement that state and local officials undertake background checks on
prospective handgun purchasers because such a requirement violated the anti-
commandeering principle of New York.64 In analyzing the limits on
congressional authority to act directly on the states, the Court emphasized the
"residual state sovereignty" protected by federalism, and that "[t]his separation
of the two spheres is one of the Constitution's structural protections of liberty.,
65
The principle of federalism meant that it was "an essential attribute of the States'
retained sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous within their
proper sphere of authority.
'66
60. New York, 505 U.S. at 156-57.
61. Id. at 177. The Court was concerned that political accountability would be
diminished if Congress could require the states to regulate in a specified manner because
"where the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials
who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the
regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their
decision." Id. at 169.
62. Id. at 177.
63. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
64. Id. at 933.
65. Id. at 921.
66. Id. at 928.
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The Court's analysis in New York and Printz signaled the possibility that
federalism reserved particular areas for state regulation, placing those areas
beyond the authority of the national government. The statutes were
unconstitutional because federalism cordoned off the states from direct federal
authority, not because Congress did not have the authority to enact the legislation
on the subject under one of its enumerated powers. Federalism, therefore,
operated as a separate restraint on the power of the national government, at least
when the government sought to regulate the states as political entities, to compel
states to implement the policy dictates of the federal government.
The Court made that point clear in Reno v. Condon,67 when it upheld the
Driver's Privacy Protection Act that restricted the states from disclosing driver's
license information. Although the statute directly regulated the states, the Court
found that the statute was a valid exercise under the Commerce Clause and
"[did] not require the States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own
citizens.""8 The Court made it plain that Garcia was effectively dead when it
described the role of federalism as an added constraint on the power of Congress
to enact legislation: "In New York and Printz, we held federal statutes invalid,
not because Congress lacked legislative authority over the subject matter, but
because those statutes violated the principles of federalism contained in the
Tenth Amendment."'69
B. United States v. Lopez: Federalism and Criminal Statutes
While the Court relied on federalism to invalidate statutes regulating the
states as states in New York and Printz, the criminal law operates directly only
on individuals and business associations-not states-and so would appear to
fall outside any significant federalism concerns. In United States v. Lopez,
however, the Court referenced federalism to support its analysis of the limit of
Congress's power to regulate under the Commerce Clause. Unlike the anti-
commandeering cases, in which federalism provided an external limit on
congressional authority, the role of federalism in interpreting criminal statutes
adopted pursuant to the commerce power was much less clear.
The statute at issue in Lopez was the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which
made it a federal crime "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm...
at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a
school zone."7 Unlike many other federal statutes, including other parts of the
federal firearms provisions, the Gun-Free School Zones Act did not require proof
67. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
68. Id. at 151.
69. Id. at 149.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000).
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of an interstate commerce element."' Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the
Court began by analyzing congressional authority to regulate "three broad
categories of activity" under the Commerce Clause: "channels of interstate
commerce"; "instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate
activities"; and "those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce."" The third category, which governed the statute at issue, required
"an analysis of whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate
commerce."" The Court concluded that possession of guns was not "an
economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect
any sort of interstate commerce.
74
As a matter of constitutional analysis, the Lopez opinion did not break new
ground beyond the fact that the Court invalidated a federal statute for exceeding
the commerce power for the first time in approximately sixty years. The Chief
Justice's majority opinion contained an oblique reference to federalism in a
footnote that described the role of the states as the "primary authority for
defining and enforcing the criminal law," and stated that "[w]hen Congress
criminalizes conduct already denounced as criminal by the States, it effects a
'change in the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal
jurisdiction.' 75  The majority opinion's brief reference to federalism was
irrelevant to its holding except to buttress the point that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act reached conduct already within the purview of the states and so
perhaps it was also an unwise extension of federal jurisdiction.
Unlike the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, joined
by Justice O'Connor, clearly relied on federalism as a basis for the Commerce
Clause analysis. Justice Kennedy argued that the statute was beyond the
authority of Congress because it upset the balance between the federal
government and the states. 76 He relied on federalism as an aspect of the
71. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(i) (2000) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to
transport or ship in interstate or foreign commerce, any stolen firearm or stolen
ammunition, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the firearm or
ammunition was stolen.").
72. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
73. Id. at 559.
74. Id. at 567.
75. Id. at 561 n.3 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) and
United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1973)). The footnote then quoted from
President Bush's statement when he signed the legislation containing the Gun-Free
School Zones Act that the law "inappropriately overrides legitimate State firearms laws
with a new and unnecessary Federal law." Id. (quoting Statement of President George
Bush on Signing the Crime Control Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoC. 1944,
1945 (Nov. 29, 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
76. Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("If Congress attempts that extension, then
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Commerce Clause analysis, stating that "[w]ere the Federal Government to take
over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having
nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries
between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political
responsibility would become illusory."" His concurrence emphasized the
Court's "particular duty to ensure that the federal-state balance is not
destroyed.""8
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion may have used federalism as a
short-handed way to acknowledge the outer limits of the Commerce Clause to
distinguish congressional authority to regulate from a state's general police
power, however slight that distinction may be in practice.79 That approach is
different from New York and Printz, which made it clear that federalism was an
independent constraint on congressional authority to regulate. The states retain
their sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment, and the federal government
cannot usurp that sovereignty without violating the principle of federalism when
Congress seeks to regulate the states as states.
Does federalism play the same role for criminal statutes by reserving to the
states the authority to define and punish certain types of crime, such as gun
possession near a school? The majority opinion in Lopez implied that, regardless
of the Commerce Clause issue, the statute at issue might be such a significant
alteration of the federal-state balance that it could violate federalism. Justice
Kennedy's concurrence directly assailed the Gun-Free School Zones Act as an
"intrusion on state sovereignty" that, while not as severe as that in New York and
Printz, "is nonetheless significant."8 For Justice Kennedy, at least, federalism
was a separate limitation on the power of Congress to enact criminal legislation
when such litigation encompasses conduct already punished by the states.
at the least we must inquire whether the exercise of national power seeks to intrude upon
an area of traditional state concern.").
77. Id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
79. See id. at 566 ("But, so long as Congress' authority is limited to those powers
enumerated in the Constitution, and so long as those enumerated powers are interpreted
as having judicially enforceable outer limits, congressional legislation under the
Commerce Clause always will engender 'legal uncertainty."').
80. Id. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Thomas made a similar point in
his concurrence, asserting that the Court's seminal Commerce Clause decision in
Gibbons v. Ogden "merely was making the well understood point that the Constitution
commits matters of 'national' concern to Congress and leaves 'local' matters to the
States." Id. at 596 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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C. United States v. Morrison: Federalism and Violent Crime
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Morrison took the Court a
step closer to the position that federalism provides an independent constraint on
the authority of Congress to regulate certain subjects. The plaintiff in Morrison
sued three students, who were members of the university's football team, for
raping her, and also sued the school for failing to handle her complaint about the
rape properly. She brought her damages claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 13981,
which provided that any "person... who commits a crime of violence motivated
by gender and thus deprives another of the right declared in subsection (b) of this
section shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages."'" Despite the extensive congressional
findings regarding the impact of gender-motivated violence on interstate
commerce, the Court held that the conduct regulated by Congress-violence
against women-was not economic in nature and, therefore, fell outside the
Commerce Clause.82 The Court relied explicitly on federalism to invalidate the
civil damages provision of VAWA, although it remained unclear what the
relationship was between federalism and the Commerce Clause analysis.
On the commerce issue, Morrison's analysis was little more than a
reiteration of Lopez. The Court rejected what it perceived was an attempt by
Congress to manufacture federal authority that would permit regulation of
virtually any subject through an expansive depiction of the effects of traditional
crimes on interstate commerce. It reaffirmed the refusal in Lopez to sanction a
limitless grant of legislative authority to Congress under the Commerce Clause
on the theory that the aggregation of any type of conduct could eventually affect
interstate commerce. The Chief Justice's opinion went further, however, by
offering a broader description of the federalism implications of VAWA.
The Court's discussion of federalism was not linked explicitly to the
Commerce Clause analysis, and it appeared to be more in the nature of a
cautionary warning to Congress not to extend federal power too far, lest the
Court be required to rein in the legislature further. Morrison's federalism
analysis began with the premise that "if Congress may regulate gender-motivated
violence, it would be able to regulate murder or any other type of violence since
gender-motivated violence, as a subset of all violent crime, is certain to have
81. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (c) (2000). Subsection (b) of the statute provided that "[aill
persons within the United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence
motivated by gender." Id. § 12981(b).
82. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("Gender-motivated
crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.... [O]ur cases
have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity
is economic in nature.").
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lesser economic impacts than the larger class of which it is a part." 3 Taken to
its logical extreme, the Court noted, such an interpretation of the commerce
power would permit regulation of "family law and other areas of traditional state
regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on
the national economy is undoubtedly significant."84 Federalism prevents that
result by operating as a further restraint on congressional authority, a restraint
which goes beyond the Court's limitation of criminal statutes enacted under the
Commerce Clause to conduct involving economic activities."
The federalism principles incorporated in the constitutional design
apparently operate as a separate limitation beyond the Commerce Clause because
"[t]he Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what
is truly local."86 Following the path to what he perceived was the logical
conclusion of this federal-state dichotomy, the Chief Justice's opinion stated that
"[t]he regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the
instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always
been the province of the States.""7 In describing the distinction between the
national government and the states, the Court stated, "[W]e can think of no better
example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National
Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and
vindication of its victims."88
83. Id. at 615.
84. Id. at 615-16.
85. The majority's language adopted a faintly derogatory tone for family law and
domestic violence, implying that these areas are unworthy of federal legislation and
instead are only of local-and hence minor-governmental interest. See Beale, supra
note 17, at 1654 ("[A]lthough the volume of cases that could fall within the civil
provisions of VAWA was limited, the subject matter was a form of extremely common
criminal activity associated with the low-status family courts or criminal courts.");
Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly: Between "The
Truly National and the Truly Local, "42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1104-05 (2001) ("Having
reduced gender-based violence to'any conduct,' or even any criminal conduct, the Court
then discursively linked it with family law issues traditionally set aside for state
regulation and jurisdiction .... Through this rhetorical practice of connecting the
adjudication of family law issues with gender-motivated crimes of violence, the Court
prohibited the transformation of these issues to a national civil rights concern.")
(footnotes omitted).
86. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.
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D. The Notion of Separate Spheres ofAuthority
Morrison's conclusion that federalism creates separate spheres of authority,
thereby reserving to the states punishment for "local" crimes, misconstrued the
distinction that federalism creates between state and federal authority. The Court
did not explain why the authority of the states to punish local crimes-violent
and otherwise-entailed a limitation on the federal government's power to
regulate similar conduct if it came within one of the, enumerated powers.
VAWA has a criminal provision that the Court recognized as falling within the
commerce power because an element of the crime required proof of interstate
travel, satisfying one of the first two Lopez categories to permit federal
regulation.8" The states' police power has never been viewed as a direct
limitation on the authority of another sovereign to punish crimes within its
jurisdiction. The authority of the states to exercise their powers is protected by
federalism, but that does not directly affect whether the federal government can
use its own authority to accomplish the same result.
The Morrison Court appeared to assume that because federalism involves
a separation between the two levels of government, there must be distinct crimes,
such as domestic violence, that Congress cannot regulate. 9 That conclusion,
however, is not supported by the premise because it assumed that the existence
of separate sovereigns meant that only one could regulate in certain areas. While
federalism may limit the national government's authority to regulate the states
directly-the essential holding of Printz and New York-it does not lead to the
conclusion that federalism deprives Congress of the authority to regulate any
particular subject."' This approach is similar to the federalism constraint
89. See id. at 613 n.5 ("The Courts of Appeals have uniformly upheld this criminal
sanction as an appropriate exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause authority.").
90. Joshua A. Klein, Note, Commerce Clause Questions After Morrison: Some
Observations on the New Formalism and the New Realism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 571, 577
(2002) ("[T]he Lopez/Morrison Court seems to have some inchoate sense of a particular
limit that is appropriate-one that preserves the 'federal and state balance."').
91. For example, it is a violation of federal law for a felon to possess a weapon that
had traveled in interstate commerce at one time. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000). The Court
upheld the constitutionality of that provision in Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S.
563 (1977), rejecting the defendant's argument that after Bass the mere possession of a
weapon, without proving that it traveled in interstate commerce while the defendant
possessed it while a convicted felon, was beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause. Id.
at 577. The Court expressed no discomfort with the conclusion that "Congress sought
to reach possessions broadly, with little concern for when the nexus with commerce
occurred." Id. Lopez did not appear to disturb the holding in Scarborough, and the
federal government can still reach a variety of situations involving the possession of a
weapon. While the Court's language in Morrison implied that certain crimes are beyond
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recognized in New York and Printz that prevented Congress from directing the
states as states to exercise their sovereign authority in a particular manner. This
view of federalism, at least with regard to congressional authority to enact
criminal laws, led Chief Justice Rehnquist to assert that if regulation was beyond
the Commerce Clause, it must be because federalism reserved the subject matter
to the states. Further, the view of federalism expressed in Morrison implied that
the Constitution reserved certain subjects, particularly violent crime, to the states
in much the same way that it granted specified powers exclusively to the federal
government.92
The constitutional grant of power to the federal government to regulate
commerce does not give the federal government exclusive authority over any
particular subject that may have some relation to commerce. The term
"commerce" is inclusive, first described by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons
v. Ogden93 as "traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse." '94 Commerce
does not have any independent content except that the subject regulated must
come within "the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of
nations."95 The Commerce Clause involves both a grant of legislative authority
to Congress and, by negative implication, a prohibition on the states from
enacting regulations that interfere with interstate commerce. It is the dormant
Commerce Clause, which limits the authority of the states to regulate by
discriminating in favor of local businesses, that raises the issue of state power
over matters of "local" concern.96
In Cooley v. Board of Wardens,97 the Court asserted judicial authority under
the Commerce Clause to invalidate state and local regulations if the subject
matter required uniform national legislation, regardless of whether Congress had
in fact occupied the field by adopting legislation.9" If the regulation dealt with
92. See Allan Ides, Economic Activity as a Proxy for Federalism: Intuition and
Reason in United States v. Morrison, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 563, 580 (2001) ("The basic
intuition behind Morrison is that the civil remedy created by VAWA transgressed the
undefined distinction between what is truly local and what is truly national.").
93. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
94. Id. at 189.
95. Id. at 189-90.
96. In Gibbons v. Ogden, the Court considered whether the Commerce Clause
permits any state regulation of matters involving interstate commerce, but did not need
to decide the issue. Id. at 200 ("In discussing the question, whether this power is still in
the States, in the case under consideration, we may dismiss from it the inquiry, whether
it is surrendered by the mere grant to Congress, or is retained until Congress shall
exercise the power.").
97. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
98. Id. at 319 ("Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or
admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such
a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress."). The application of the
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a matter of local interest, then the states retained the authority to exercise their
police powers to enact regulations.99 Thus, for many years, dormant Commerce
Clause analysis depended on the distinction between what was a national
concern and what subjects permitted the states to continue regulation because of
the local nature of the issue.
Morrison's reference to the distinction between subjects that are "truly
national" and "truly local" harkens back to the early Commerce Clause
jurisprudence of Gibbons and Cooley, but it used those notions in a completely
different context. The Court in those early Commerce Clause cases sought to
determine the extent of the states' authority to enact regulations that affected
interstate commerce, and Chief Justice Marshall advanced the position that they
might not have retained any authority.' °0 The issue was not whether Congress
could legislate on a subject, but the extent of the police power retained by the
states when Congress had not legislated on the subject. The recognition of the
dormant Commerce Clause in Cooley was a compromise that preserved broad
federal authority and the police power of the states to maintain regulations in a
number of areas where they had traditionally operated.°' Ultimately, Cooley's
dormant Commerce Clause has been subject to severe criticism, but it remains a fixture
of constitutional jurisprudence. See Patrick C. McGinley, Trashing the Constitution:
Judicial Activism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Federalism Mantra, 71 OR.
L. REV. 409, 410 (1992) ("The fact is that in the 114 years since the doctrine of the
negative Commerce Clause was formally adopted by the Court, and in the 50 years prior
to that in which it was alluded to in various dicta of the Court, our applications of the
doctrine have, not to put too fine a point on the matter, made no sense.").
99. Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319 ("Now the power to regulate commerce,
embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite
unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule, operating
equally on the commerce of the United States in every port; and some, like the subject
now in question, as imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone can meet the
local necessities of navigation.").
100. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 209 ("It has been contended by the
counsel for the appellant, that, as the word 'to regulate' implies in its nature, full power
over the thing to be regulated, it excludes, necessarily, the action of all others that would
perform the same operation on the same thing. That regulation is designed for the entire
result, applying to those parts which remain as they were, as well as to those which are
altered. It produces a uniform whole, which is as much disturbed and deranged by
changing what the regulating power designs to leave untouched, as that on which it has
operated. There is great force in this argument, and the Court is not satisfied that it has
been refuted.").
101. See Robert A. Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a Restriction on
State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31
WAYNE L. REV. 885, 923 (1985) ("The Court's holding in Cooley was obviously a
compromise between the view that the commerce power was an exclusive federal power
so as to preclude all state regulation or taxation affecting interstate commerce and the
view that the commerce clause imposed no restriction at all on the reserved general
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reliance on dividing subjects into national and local areas broke down and the
Court instead adopted a balancing approach that looks to the effect of state
regulations on interstate commerce and whether the laws at issue are a form of
economic protectionism.'° 2
Morrison took the notion of the division between national and local subjects
that was once important in Commerce Clause jurisprudence-and revived briefly
in Hammer v. Dagenhart to limit federal authority over manufacturing and
mining' ' 3-and appeared to enshrine it as one aspect of the core meaning of
federalism. The Court's reference to family law and violent crimes as areas of
peculiar local concern, subject to the states' police power, was not in the context
of its analysis of the commerce power but rather an assertion that the
Constitution somehow preserves core areas for exclusive state control. It is
interesting to note that neither the dormant Commerce Clause, the source for the
purported distinction between subjects of national and local interest, nor the
principle of federalism is found in the words of the Constitution. Yet, according
to Morrison, federalism acted as a type of independent constraint on
congressional authority to adopt legislation on the subject of rape, wholly apart
from the limits of the Commerce Clause, as an independent means to preserve
certain subjects for exclusive state regulation.'"4
regulatory and taxation power of the states.")
102. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § § 8.6-.7
(6th ed. 2000) (The Court "had continuing difficulty with the practical application of the
Cooley doctrine" and in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), adopted
a balancing test to determine whether a state regulation impermissibly burdens interstate
commerce.).
103. See Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J.
431, 472 (2002) (Morrison "revived aspects of the 'dual sovereignty' approach of
Hammer v. Dagenhart, albeit limited to the 'substantial effects' aspect of commerce
doctrine.") (footnote omitted).
104. Congressional authority to regulate commerce does not necessarily displace
state regulation of the subject matter, at least insofar as the state regulation does not
interfere with interstate commerce. The states have long had power over health and
safety issues, for example. While Congress has the exclusive right to regulate interstate
and foreign commerce, which prevents the states from adopting their own regulations
even if Congress has not chosen to legislate, the Commerce Clause does not affect the
authority of the states to regulate the subject matter of that commercial intercourse within
their own borders when the burden on commerce is only incidental. See Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("Where the statute regulates even-handedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.").
Professor Sedler asserts that, after Cooley, the Supreme Court viewed the national-
local distinction as limiting the federal government's power to regulate on a topic which
was deemed local under the dormant Commerce Clause. See Sedler, supra note 101, at
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The assertion in Morrison-and to a lesser extent in Lopez-that federalism
required that the states have exclusive authority over some types of criminal
conduct is flawed because the Court's premise is unsupportable. While
federalism creates competing levels of government by preserving the sovereignty
of the states, it does not mean the states must have exclusive control over certain
types of crime regardless of whether Congress has the constitutional authority to
regulate under the Commerce Clause or any other power. °5 The Constitution's,
denial of a general police power to the federal government did not establish that
the regulation of certain subjects, such as family law or crimes of violence, was
reserved exclusively to the states. Instead, the authority granted to the federal
government to regulate commerce permits Congress to adopt legislation that
reaches even those areas already within the police power of the states.
The Constitution did not create exclusive spheres of state authority that
independently proscribed congressional authority to adopt criminal laws.
Although federalism may operate as an independent constraint on congressional
authority to regulate the states, New York and Printz did not hold that regulation
of low-level radioactive waste and the purchase of firearms was reserved
exclusively to the states. The anti-commandeering rule applied in those cases
because the means Congress chose-requiring state authorities to implement the
national government's policy decisions-was an impermissible invasion of the
sovereignty of the states. It was not the subject matter but the method of
implementation that violated the federalism principle.
Unlike the statutes invalidated in New York and Printz, criminal laws
neither commandeer the states to do the federal government's bidding nor
displace state criminal laws. Therefore, while the Constitution may limit
Congress from pursuing its goals by certain means because of federalism, it does
not do so by reserving selected subjects and placing them outside any federal
assertion of authority. And yet, that seemed to be Chief Justice Rehnquist's
point in Morrison when he described "family law and other areas of traditional
state regulation" as subjects beyond congressional authority, regardless of
whether the legislation bore a sufficient nexus to the commerce power.
924 n. 147 ("If the activity being regulated was held not to constitute 'commerce' within
the meaning of the commerce clause, the commerce clause, in its negative aspect, could
not be relied on to challenge state regulation of that activity. This also meant, however,
that the activity could not be regulated by Congress in the affirmative exercise of the
commerce power."). At least with regard to criminal statutes, the Court in Champion v.
Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903), upheld a federal prohibition on the
interstate transportation of lottery tickets enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause even
though the states had the authority to regulate lotteries under their police powers. See
infra text accompanying notes 137-40.
105. See Klein, supra note 18, at 1553 ("[W]here federal criminal laws regulate
conduct already regulated by the states, such federal legislation does not displace the state
criminal justice system, but rather supplements it with concurrent jurisdiction.").
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Morrison's seeming claim that certain subjects are beyond the authority of
the national government because they are "local" in nature has significant
implications for federal criminal law. If a statute reaches one of those reserved
local subjects, then it may be unconstitutional regardless of any inquiry into
congressional authority to adopt the law under one of the powers enumerated in
the Constitution."0 6 Perhaps the statute itself is a permissible exercise of
congressional authority, but its application in a particular case may reach into
local affairs in a way that offends federalism as Chief Justice Rhenquist viewed
it in Morrison. The effect of this view of federalism creates uncertainty in a
wide variety of federal prosecutions, and is at odds with the development of the
federal criminal law.
In the next section, this Article reviews the Supreme Court's analysis of
federal criminal law, and how it has historically accepted that federal provisions
operate in many areas already subject to state regulation. The fact that both the
federal and state governments can enforce criminal laws covering similar
conduct has not been troubling in a constitutional sense. If federalism does
reserve certain criminal misconduct to exclusive state regulation because of its
peculiarly "local" nature, then that would signal a major change in the scope of
federal criminal law. I argue that the dichotomous view expressed in Lopez and
Morrison represents a shift based on a misguided understanding of how
federalism operates as a limit on congressional authority but does not restrain the
authority of the executive branch to enforce the laws.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
The Court's discussion of federalism in Lopez and especially Morrison was
misleading when it described the relationship between the states and the national
government as one involving exclusive areas of control. The Constitution
permits both levels of government to operate concurrently in many areas,
including the punishment of misconduct. Criminal statutes adopted by the First
Congress show that the Framers did not confine federal law to those crimes
enumerated in the Constitution, and the statutes reached much conduct already
prohibited by the states.
Federalism requires that there be a national interest in the type of conduct
regulated by the criminal provision, but there was no sense that Congress could
not legislate pursuant to one of its enumerated powers because a particular
subject was already prosecuted by the states. Prior to Lopez and Morrison, the
106. See Ides, supra note 92, at 579 ("[T]he problem [in Lopez and Morrison] was
that Congress was attempting to regulate matters that in the Court's view were
traditionally and perhaps exclusively left to the states. All this talk about economic or
commercial activity (or any of the other doctrinal elements mentioned in these two
opinions) was simply a proxy for this much more significant theme.").
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Court's approach to interpreting the scope of federal criminal statutes accepted
that Congress could designate conduct as subject to federal prosecution pursuant
to one of its enumerated powers without violating the sovereignty of the states
or traversing the limitations of federalism. Although the states retain primary
authority for defining and punishing criminal conduct through the police power,
their sovereignty would not be undermined by federal criminal statutes so long
as there is a sufficient national interest identified by Congress and a
constitutional authority, such as the Commerce Clause, to adopt the provision.
The Court did not conclude, however, that the Constitution reserved the criminal
law to the states and denied it to the national government.
A. The First Federal Crimes
The Constitution provides explicit congressional authority to punish
counterfeiting federal coins and securities," 7 piracy and felonies committed on
the high seas,' and treason.0 9 In addition, Congress has the power of
"exclusive Legislation" over the federal district, which necessarily would include
providing a criminal code."0
One of the first statutes enacted by Congress set the rate for duties on
imports and included a prohibition on "any officer of the customs [who] shall,
directly or indirectly, take or receive any bribe, reward or recompense for
conniving, or shall connive at a false entry of any ship or vessel, or of any goods,
wares or merchandise.""' There was a clear national interest in punishing
bribery related to customs duties---collectors of customs were among the first
presidential appointments after ratification of the Constitution and import duties
were the principal source of federal revenue' -but the constitutional source of
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6 ("To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting
the Securities and current Coin of the United States.").
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 ("To define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.").
109. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to declare the
Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or
Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.").
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Congress also has authority to "make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States," U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, and to "make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. These
provisions give Congress the authorityto enact criminal laws related to crimes committed
on federal land and by members of the military.
111. Act of July 31, 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 46 (1789). Congress adopted the provision
approximately two months before it adopted the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, that
created the federal courts in which violators of the provision would be prosecuted.
112. See LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, THE CUSTOMS SERVICE: ITS HISTORY,
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this provision was not entirely clear. The collection of customs duties relates to
congressional authority to regulate foreign commerce, and Congress has the
authority to "lay and collect [t]axes,""' 3 so the criminal provision may be an
incident to those powers. The bribery provision was not, however, an exercise
of one of the enumerated powers in the Constitution explicitly authorizing the
adoption of a federal criminal law, and the crime was certainly one that also
came within the authority of the states to prosecute. This first federal criminal
law did not supplant the law of the states, but it provided a means to reach
misconduct that was of paramount concem to the federal government.
The next year, the First Congress adopted a broad set of laws that addressed
a number of crimes for which there was also no explicit constitutional authority.
Among the federal offenses created was theft of court records, bribery of federal
judges, perjury, and obstruction of court officers."" These provisions protected
the federal judicial process from corruption, and were an adjunct to the
congressional power in Article III to create the lower federal courts."' There
was no enumerated power to adopt statutes that reached these offenses, most of
which were already subject to state prosecution. Professor Currie has noted,
"Clearly the First Congress did not view the list of topics of federal criminal law
as implicitly negating authority to create other offenses when that was necessary
and proper to the exercise of some other explicit federal power."" 6
ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATION 6 (1924) ("On August 3[, 1789], the President sent to the
Senate the nominations of fifty-nine collectors, thirty-three surveyors, and ten naval
officers, these nominations forming the first list of officers appointed under the
[C]onstitution."); DON WHITEHEAD, BORDER GUARD: THE STORY OF THE UNITED STATES
CUSTOMS SERVICE 25 (1963) ("[U]ntil the income tax amendment to the Constitution was
adopted in 1913-the Federal government's primary source of revenue was to be the
money collected by Customs on merchandise and materials brought into the United States
from abroad."). In 1792, receipts from customs duties totaled $3,443,070.85, while
receipts from internal taxes, such as those imposed on distilled spirits, carriages, and
snuff, totaled $208,942.81. See LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER & FRANCIS X. A. EBLE,
THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE: ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATION 4
(1923).
113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
114. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 15, 18,21-23, 1 Stat. 115-17 (1790). Judicial
officers and customs collectors were the only federal officials in most localities, and the
federal criminal laws prohibiting bribery and interference with the judicial process
covered almost all the activities of the nascent government. See SCHMECKEBIER,
CUSTOMS, supra note 112, at 6 ("[F]or some time the custom officers were the only local
officers of the United States except the judges, marshals, and clerks of courts.").
115. U.S. CONST. art. III, § I ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish.").
116. David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First
Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 833 (1994); see Kurland, supra note 30,
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In addition to the creation of federal crimes beyond those the authority for
which was enumerated in the Constitution, the First Congress also addressed the
issue of where a federal prosecution could be brought. The Judiciary Act of
1789 provided for exclusive federal court jurisdiction of federal crimes," 7 but
because of the hardship created on litigants and jurors forced to travel great
distances to the few federal courts, Congress later adopted a number of criminal
provisions that permitted the state courts to adjudicate cases for violation of
federal criminal laws."' Federal criminal law did not eliminate or constrain the
police power of the states, but provided an added protection for the federal
government to vindicate its own interests. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,' '
Justice Story asserted in dictum that "[n]o part of the criminal jurisdiction of the
United States can consistently with the Constitution, be delegated to state
tribunals, ' a position he reiterated a few years later in Houston v. Moore.'2 '
The opposition to state court jurisdiction over federal offenses expressed by
Justice Story was not that Congress had somehow usurped state authority in
adopting criminal laws, but rather, that those laws were an important attribute of
the sovereignty of the national government and their enforcement should not be
delegated to the states. Both levels of government could exercise their power to
proscribe criminal acts, each operating independently of the other.
The issue of whether the Commerce Clause provided authority to adopt a
criminal provision reaching conduct already subject to state prosecution came
before the Supreme Court in 1838 in United States v. Coombs. 2 ' The
government charged the defendant with stealing items from a ship that had run
aground, and he challenged the federal court's admiralty jurisdiction because the
at 11-12 ("[T]he historical record demonstrates that the Framers provided for relatively
broad federal criminal authority, not limited to the few express grants of federal criminal
authority specified in the Constitution.").
117. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76-77 (1789) (District court
jurisdiction was "exclusively of the Courts of the several States .. .that shall be
cognizable under the authority of the United States, committed within their respective
districts, or upon the high seas.").
118. See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act
of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 70 (1923) (During the twenty years after passage of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress passed "many statutes vesting in the State Courts such
jurisdiction over Federal questions both in civil and criminal cases."); Kurland, supra
note 30, at 62 ("Congress recognized the extreme burdens on the citizenry if even minor
federal offenses were required to be tried in distant federal courts, which, at the time,
were few.").
119. 14U.S.(I Wheat.)304(1816).
120. Id. at 337.
121. 18 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1, 69 (1820) ("In a government formed like ours, where
there is a division of sovereignty ... it would seem a peculiarly safe and salutary rule,
that each government should be left to enforce its own penal laws in its own tribunals.").
122. 37 U.S. (I Pet.) 72 (1838).
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ship was above the high water mark on the beach and, therefore, not on the high
seas.'23 Although the Court agreed that the ship was not within the admiralty
jurisdiction, it held that the provision was a proper exercise of the commerce
power to reach conduct on land. According to the Court, congressional authority
"extends to such acts, done on land, which interfere with, obstruct, or prevent the
due exercise of the power to regulate commerce."' 24 The Court then rejected the
proposition that, because the defendant's crime-theft--came within the
criminal law of the states, it could not be the subject of a separate federal
prosecution: "[I]t could scarcely be deemed prudent or satisfactory wholly to
rely upon state legislatures or state laws, for the protection of rights and interests
specially confided by the constitution to the authority of congress."
Coombs accepted congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to
enact criminal laws that reached conduct already subject to state prosecution.
The Court's holding rested on the principle that the national government's
interest could be vindicated through a federal criminal statute even though state
laws already authorized punishment for the exact same conduct. Federal and
state authority coexisted, and the Court did not express any concern that the
federal enactment somehow displaced the authority of the states or invaded their
sovereignty.
In addition to the Commerce Clause, Congress in 1792 exercised its
authority under the Postal Clause'25 to adopt criminal statutes, reaching a variety
of offenses involving the use and delivery of the mail, that also constituted state
crimes, such as theft.'26 Congressional authority over the postal system is
exclusive, although there is no express grant of power to adopt criminal laws.
The criminal provisions adopted by Congress under the postal power did not
create exclusive federal jurisdiction over crimes involving the postal system, nor
did the law preempt the states from prosecuting common law offenses, such as
larceny, that involved the mails. Like the criminal laws adopted by the First
Congress, the postal legislation did not supplant the police power of the states
123. The provision under which the defendant was charged made it a criminal
offense for:
[A]ny person . .. [to] plunder, steal, or destroy, any money, goods,
merchandise, or other effects, from or belonging to any ship or vessel, or boat,
or raft, which shall be in distress, or which shall be wrecked, lost, stranded,
or cast away, upon the sea, or upon any reef, shoal, bank, or rocks, of the sea,
or in any other place within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States.
Act of 1825, ch. 65, § 9, 4 Stat. 116 (1825).
124. Coombs, 37 U.S. (I Pet.) at 78.
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7 ("To establish Post Offices and post Roads.").
126. Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 17, 1 Stat. 237 (1792).
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but provided an additional protection beyond what the states could--or
would-furnish to protect important federal interests.
127
B. The Court Confronts an Expanding Federal Criminal Law
The Postal and Commerce Clauses were the primary sources of
congressional authority to enact broader criminal laws to combat abuses in the
developing national economy during the post-Civil War era. In 1868, Congress
adopted a statute to outlaw use of the mails for lotteries, and a short time later
enacted the first version of the Mail Fraud statute that prohibited the use of the
mails for "any scheme or artifice to defraud."' 12' Representative Farnsworth,
sponsor of the Mail Fraud statute, stated that the law would "prevent the fraud
which are mostly gotten up in the large cities ... by thieves, forgers, and
rapscallions generally."" 9 The statute clearly reached a crime-larceny by
trick'-already prosecuted under the common law of every state, although the
federal statute went much further by encompassing any scheme to defraud and
not just completed conduct.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the criminal prohibition
on the use of the mails for transporting lottery tickets in Ex parte Jackson,"I
holding that the postal power gave Congress the authority "to refuse its facilities
for the distribution of matter deemed injurious to the public morals."' 32 The
harm from the conduct was not to the postal system itself, nor to the federal
government, which suffered no direct or pecuniary loss. Nevertheless, the Court
127. See Kurland, supra note 30, at 58 (The postal crimes provisions "also
criminalized conduct that was very likely proscribed by state criminal law as well, but
which Congress nevertheless had determined affected a federal interest of sufficient
importance to be made the subject of federal criminal law. This development further
established the principle of overlapping criminal jurisdiction between the states and the
federal government in areas outside of the express grants of federal criminal law
authority.").
128. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, § 13, 15 Stat. 194, 196 (1868); Act of June 8,
1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 283, 323 (1872).
129. CONG. GLOBE, 41 st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870) (statement of Rep. Farnsworth);
see Peter J. Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be Called Federal Fraud: The Changing
Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REV. 435, 441-43 (1995) (discussing the
history of the Mail Fraud statute).
130. The common law offense of larceny required proof of a "trespassory taking
and carrying away of the personal property of another with the intent to permanently
deprive the possessor of the property." JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
LAW § 32.02[A], at 546 (3d ed. 2001). The use of fraud, rather than a physical taking,
to obtain possession of property was first recognized as a form of larceny in Pear's Case.
King v. Pear, 1 Leach 212, 168 Eng. Rep. 208 (1779).
131. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
132. Id. at 736.
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held that Congress possessed the power to enact legislation designed to protect
individuals from criminal conduct involving use of the facilities of the federal
government. While not an exercise of a general police power, Jackson signaled
a broad view of federal authority to enact criminal laws covering conduct already
subject to state prosecution, in the name of protecting the public from harm
through the use of a facility entrusted to the federal government.'33 The Court
confirmed this expansive understanding of congressional power in Ex parte
Rapier,'34 stating that "[i]t is not necessary that Congress should have the power
to deal with crime or immorality within the states in order to maintain that it
possesses the power to forbid the use of the mails in aid of the perpetration of
crime or immorality."' 35
Similar to the Mail Fraud statute, Congress expanded the Lottery Act in
1895 to prohibit any transfer of lottery tickets in interstate commerce in addition
to barring the use of the mails for that purpose. '3 6 In Champion v. Ames (Lottery
Case),'37 the Court took the same broad approach to congressional power to
enact criminal laws under the Commerce Clause that it took in Jackson and
Rapier with the Postal Clause. The Court upheld the provision on the ground
that Congress may regulate interstate commerce by prohibiting any transfer
among the states of an item Congress deemed harmful, regardless of whether a
state permitted the operation of a lottery within its borders.'38 In reaching that
conclusion, the Champion Court rejected the argument that the statute violated
the Tenth Amendment because it regulated an activity already subject to state
control under the police power. The Court stated:
In legislating upon the subject of the traffic in lottery tickets, as carried
on through interstate commerce, Congress only supplemented the
action of those states-perhaps all of them-which, for the protection
of the public morals, prohibit the drawing of lotteries, as well as the
sale or circulation of lottery tickets, within their respective limits.'39
133. See Henning, supra note 129, at 443 ("Thus, at least in the Supreme Court's
view in 1878, the constitutionality of the expansion of federal jurisdiction over what had
been state crimes was tied directly to Congress's power to regulate the post office.").
134. 143 U.S. 110 (1892).
135. Id. at 134.
136. Act of March 2, 1895, ch. 191, § 1, 28 Stat. 963 (1895).
137. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
138. Id. at 326.
139. Id. at 327 (emphasis added). In Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S.
45 (1911), the Court upheld the seizure of adulterated food under the Food and Drug Act
because there was no violation of state sovereignty arising from the seizure: "The
question here is whether articles which are outlaws of commerce may be seized wherever
found; and it certainly will not be contended that they are outside of the jurisdiction of
the national government when they are within the borders of a state." Id. at 58.
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Chief Justice Fuller dissented, arguing that the provision was an exercise of a
general police power that the Constitution reserved to the states, and, therefore,
the states had "exclusive" authority to adopt measures to eliminate lotteries, not
the federal government. 40
In Hoke v. United States, 4' the Court rejected for a second time the
argument that a federal criminal provision exceeded the scope of congressional
authority to regulate conduct already subject to state criminal laws. It upheld the
constitutionality of the Mann Act, which prohibited the interstate transportation
of females for immoral purposes. It found no merit to the argument that the law
was "a subterfuge and an attempt to interfere with the police power of the states
to regulate the morals of their citizens, and ... that it is in consequence an
invasion of the reserved powers of the states."' 42 Although the states and the
national government have "different spheres of jurisdiction," the authority of
each is exercised "whether independently or concurrently, to promote the general
welfare, material and moral."' 43 The federal criminal law did not displace the
states from their historic role, but provided important support to reach
misconduct already subject to state prosecution, so that the Commerce Clause
gave Congress the authority to "adopt not only means necessary but convenient
to its exercise, and the means may have the quality of police regulations."'"
140. Champion, 188 U.S. at 330 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice stated:
The power of the state to impose restraints and burdens on persons and
property in conservation and promotion of the public health, good order, and
prosperity is a power originally and always belonging to the states, not
surrendered by them to the general government, nor directly restrained by the
Constitution of the United States, and essentially exclusive, and the
suppression of lotteries as a harmful business falls within this power,
commonly called, of police.
Id. (citing Douglas v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488 (1897)).
This was the first assertion of the position that federal criminal legislation invaded
the reserved powers of the states and, therefore, might be beyond the authority of
Congress to adopt, regardless of whether Congress might have authority in the area. See
also Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of
Congress's Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 849, 880 (2002)
("[T]his permissive attitude toward using an enumerated power to infringe on the police
power, an area reserved to the States, seems inconsistent with the Constitution's
structure.").
141. 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
142. Id. at 321.
143. Id. at 322.
144. Id. at 323. In United States v. Barnow, 239 U.S. 74 (1915), the Court rejected
a challenge to a criminal statute making it an offense to engage in a fraudulent scheme
by pretending to be a federal official, which the defendant argued was beyond the power
of Congress to adopt because it "encroaches upon the functions of the several states to
protect their own citizens and residents from fraud." Id. at 77. The Court held that the
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The Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence took an abrupt, although
short-lived, turn toward substantially limiting the scope of congressional
authority to enact criminal laws under the Commerce Clause in Hammer v.
Dagenhart'45 The Court struck down the Child Labor Act because the statute
did not reach interstate transportation but, rather, "the production of articles,
intended for interstate commerce, [which] is a matter of local regulation." '4 6 The
majority opinion expressed concern that if it upheld the law, "all manufacture
intended for interstate shipment would be brought under federal control to the
practical exclusion of the authority of the states."'47 The Court noted the
substantial constitutional problem with such broad federal authority: "The
maintenance of the authority of the states over matters purely local is as essential
to the preservation of our institutions as is the conservation of the supremacy of
the federal power in all matters entrusted to the nation by the federal
Constitution."' 48 Hammer v. Dagenhart concluded with the apocalyptic warning
that:
[I]f Congress can thus regulate matters entrusted to local authority by
prohibition of the movement of commodities in interstate commerce,
all freedom of commerce will be at an end, and the power of the states
over local matters may be eliminated, and thus our system of
government be practically destroyed.'49
The Court viewed the Child Labor Act as invading the sovereignty of the
states because the prohibition worked by the federal provision effectively
precluded state regulation over "matters purely local."' 50 The emphasis on the
statute was:
[W]ell within the authority of Congress. In order that the vast and
complicated operations of the government of the United States shall be carried
on successfully and with a minimum of friction and obstruction, it is
important-or, at least, Congress reasonably might so consider it-not only
that the authority of the governmental officers and employees be respected in
particular cases, but that a spirit of respect and good will for the government
and its officers shall generally prevail.
Id. at 78.
145. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941).
146. Id. at 272.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 275.
149. Id. at 276.
150. The Court's holding conflicted with its treatment of other federal criminal
laws that approached the federal statute as almost a cooperative federal-state effort to a
problem and not an attempt by the federal government to preclude the state from
2003)
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need to preserve local control indicated that a regulation coming within
congressional authority over commerce would not be constitutional if it reached
an area already subject to the police power of the states. Much as Morrison
proclaimed almost eighty years later, the majority in Hammer asserted that there
was a core area subject to exclusive state regulation-the "purely local" subject
of child labor in factories and mines in a state-that Congress could not reach
under an exercise of even its broadest power, the Commerce Clause. Hammer
took a narrow approach to the commerce power, informed by a view of
federalism that required a separation between national and state authority into
exclusive spheres, at least for certain subjects.''
regulating the same conduct. Justice Holmes dissented in Hammer, arguing that "[tlhe
Act does not meddle with anything belonging to the States. They may regulate their
internal affairs and their domestic commerce as they like." Id. at 281 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). The analysis in Hammer was unclear because, while it did not explicitly
overturn any prior decisions, the Court appeared to signal a significant change in the
scope of congressional authority to adopt criminal regulations under the Commerce
Clause. The Court acknowledged that Congress could regulate interstate transportation
of manufactured items, noting that the statutes in Hoke and Champion were
constitutionally permissible because they regulated commerce and not just a local
activity. The Child Labor Act was somehow different because the law reached
manufactured items and not the transport of them, although the Court could only assert
its conclusion that manufacturing was not commerce without explaining how that
distinction made any difference. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme
Court: 1910-1921, 1985 DuKE L.J. 1I 11, 1122-23 ("As an original matter, a respectable
argument could have been made that the commerce power should be construed, in light
of its purpose, only to authorize measures that removed obstructions to commerce. The
difficulty was that this position had been rejected both in [Champion] and Hoke, neither
of which the Hammer Court purported to question.").
151. The Court extended its analysis of the separation between federal and state
authority in invalidating the Child Labor Tax Act in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259
U.S. 20 (1922). The Act sought the same result as the Child Labor Act by imposing a
significant tax on goods manufactured by companies using child labor. The Court found
that Hammer's analysis controlled, holding that, "here the so-called tax is a penalty to
coerce people of a state to act as Congress wishes them to act in respect of a matter
completely the business of the state government under the federal Constitution." Id. at
39. It is interesting to note that Justice Day, the author of Hammer v. Dagenhart, also
wrote the Court's opinion the following year in United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86
(1919), that rejected the defendant's federalism argument that the Harrison Narcotic Drug
Act invaded the police power of the states. Congress enacted the law under the tax
power, not the Commerce Clause, and the Court stated "[n]or is it sufficient to invalidate
the taxing authority given to the Congress by the Constitution that the same business may
be regulated by the police power of the state." Id. at 93-94. Although unsympathetic to
the federalism argument in Doremus, the Court took the opposite approach three years
later in Bailey, finding that the Child Labor Tax Act invaded the authority of the states
to regulate under the police power. Bailey rather feebly attempted to distinguish
Doremus on the ground that the child labor tax was designed to achieve a result "plainly
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Hammer's position that "purely local matters" fell outside the Commerce
Clause was good law for less than twenty years, and the Court rejected explicitly
its narrow view of the commerce power in United States v. Darby.12 The Court
held, "It is no objection to the assertion of the power to regulate interstate
commerce that its exercise is attended by the same incidents which attend the
exercise of the police power of the states."' 3 Darby moved the constitutional
focus for congressional enactments, especially criminal provisions, away from
the subject matter of the law-i.e., whether the conduct was a "purely local
matter"--so that the existence of state regulation was irrelevant to the authority
of Congress to enact the statute. Hammer was an aberration in the Court's
approach to federal criminal statutes, 54 and Darby restored the position that
Congress may regulate through the criminal law if the provision comes within
one of the Constitution's enumerated powers, rejecting the notion that the police
power of a state may insulate certain subjects from congressional legislative
authority. The subject of congressional regulation must still be one of national
interest, so that federal law did not displace the states but provided an additional
means of protecting the people so long as Congress saw fit to exercise its
authority.
C. Statutory Interpretation and Limits on Federal Criminal Law:
Perez and Bass
Beginning in the New Deal era and continuing to today, Congress has
expanded the federal criminal law so that it now encompasses most types of
criminal conduct already subject to state and local prosecution. This expansion
was especially noticeable for crimes involving violence, as the national
government responded to political pressure to crack down on crime.' The new
within state police power," Bailey, 259 U.S. at 43, but that was also true in Doremus,
which sought, through a tax, to outlaw the manufacture of opium. Doremus repeated the
Court's position that "[i]f the legislation enacted has some reasonable relation to the
exercise of the taxing authority conferred by the Constitution, it cannot be invalidated
because of the supposed motives which induced it." Doremus, 249 U.S. at 93. Bailey
ignored precedent to prevent Congress from using the tax power to do an end-run around
Hammer, a result that had little to do with constitutional principles.
152. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
153. Id. at 114. The Court overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart because that decision
"was a departure from the principles which have prevailed in the interpretation of the
commerce clause both before and since the decision and that such vitality, as a precedent,
as it then had has long since been exhausted." Id. at 116-17.
154. See Currie, supra note 150, at 1122 (The Court in Hammer "executed a sharp
about-face" from its prior precedents.).
155. See Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define
the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGs L.J. 979, 980-81
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federal statutes usually replicated crimes prosecuted by the states, although many
included an element of the offense involving proof of a federal interest, such as
interstate commerce or use of the mails. In the rush to expand the number of
crimes subject to federal prosecution, Congress often adopted provisions with
little thought about whether the national interest was served by the legislation.
Moreover, the statutes were not always drafted with precision, so that different
laws overlapped" 6 and crimes were poorly defined, leaving it to the federal
courts to engage in the painstaking process of statutory interpretation to explain
the scope of the federal criminal provisions.
Although the Supreme Court in Darby rejected the "purely local" analysis
of Hammer, the process of statutory interpretation still required the Court to
consider whether Congress had the constitutional authority to adopt a particular
provision. In United States v. Perez,' the Court upheld the Consumer Credit
Protection Act as a proper exercise of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause that permitted federal prosecution for extortionate credit activities, i.e.,
loan-sharking. "' The crime involved the use of violence or threats to extract
payments, an area subject to prosecution under state law, and the Court found
that Congress could legislate on the same topic because "it was the class of
activities regulated that was the measure" of the commerce power and not
whether the criminal conduct itself involved any interstate movement. 5 9 Perez
established the outer limit of congressional authority to legislate under the
Commerce Clause, requiring only that there be a connection in the aggregate
between the activity subject to the criminal prohibition and interstate
commerce.160
(1995) ("[T]here are now more than 3,000 federal crimes. By the mid-1990s, the
accumulation of new statutes had reversed the pattern that held for the first century of the
nation: the bulk of the federal criminal code now treats conduct that is also subject to
regulation under the states' general police powers.") (footnote omitted).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1979) (The Court
noted the "partial redundancy" of two provisions involving felons possessing firearms,
one of which permitted a five-year sentence, the other only a two-year sentence, and held
that "when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may
prosecutes [sic] under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of
defendants.").
157. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
158. The Act provides in part: "Whoever makes any extortionate extension of
credit, or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
20 years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 892(a) (2000). It defines an "extortionate extension of
credit" as "any extension of credit with respect to which it is the understanding of the
creditor and the debtor at the time it is made that delay in making repayment or failure
to make repayment could result in the use of violence or other criminal means to cause
harm to the person, reputation, or property of any person." 18 U.S.C. § 891(6) (2000).
159. Perez, 402 U.S. at 153.
160. Id. at 154 ("Where the class of activities is regulated and that class is within
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In the process of interpreting criminal statutes, the issue arose whether the
constitutional authority for enacting the provision must also be proven as an
element of the offense. All crimes require the government to prove specified
conduct (actus reus) and the applicable mental state (mens rea) as defined by the
statute. If Congress enacted a criminal law based on its commerce power, one
question was whether proof of an effect on interstate commerce was an element
of the crime and not just an issue of constitutional authority. The loan-sharking
statute reviewed in Perez did not require any proof of an effect on interstate
commerce.
In United States v. Bass,'6 ' the Court reviewed a statute making it a crime
for any felon "who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting
commerce ... any firearm."' 62 The government argued that the commerce
element of the statute only modified "transports" and did not require proof that
the defendant possessed a firearm "in commerce" for a conviction. The Court
held that the government must "show the requisite nexus with interstate
commerce" for any conviction under the statute, which it asserted was "the more
plausible construction" of the provision.'63
As a matter of statutory interpretation, the Court was no doubt correct
regarding the necessity to prove the commerce element for a possession charge.
Near the end of its opinion, however, Bass referred to "a second principle
supporting today's result: unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will
not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance.""' It was
not clear how this notion of a "federal-state balance" entered into the statutory
analysis of the firearm statute, and the Court did not refer explicitly to either
federalism or the Tenth Amendment as the basis for its assertion. The Court
implied that a different interpretation of the commerce element would present a
significant constitutional problem because "[a]bsent proof of some interstate
commerce nexus in each case, Section 1202(a) dramatically intrudes upon
traditional state criminal jurisdiction."'6 5
Bass did not explain the nature of this intrusion, and made no reference to
earlier precedents acknowledging that congressional authority to protect morality
the reach of federal power, the courts have no power 'to excise, as trivial, individual
instances' of the class.") (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968)).
161. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (2000).
163. Bass, 404 U.S. at 340. The Court stated that it did not need to consider Perez:
In light of our disposition of the case, we do not reach the question whether,
upon appropriate findings, Congress can constitutionally punish the 'mere
possession' of firearms; thus, we need not consider the relevance, in that
connection, of our recent decision in Perez v. United States.
Id. at 339 n.4.
164. Id. at 349.
165. Id. at 350.
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through criminal laws did not invade the police power. The Court's cursory
discussion of the federal-state balance did not appear to be the application of an
independent constitutional principle limiting the power of Congress to adopt
criminal laws, but more as a rationale for its decision to read the statute narrowly
to require proof of the interstate commerce element for all three acts that would
constitute a violation. Yet, Bass took an idea first raised in Hammer-that a
federal criminal statute that reached "purely local" conduct would fall outside the
scope of the Commerce Clause-and offered it as a principle of statutory
interpretation to limit the scope of federal criminal laws. 166
Perez and Bass present an interesting contrast. Perez endorsed a broad
reading of congressional authority to adopt criminal laws under the Commerce
Clause-one without an interstate commerce element-while Bass cautioned
that statutes must incorporate a federal interest in the prosecution or they may
somehow exceed the authority of Congress to adopt the provision. Although the
loan-sharking statute did not require proof of how the conduct affected interstate
commerce, credit transactions clearly involve economic activity so there was no
need to require proof of a commerce element for the offense. Bass also did not
need to address whether there was a constitutional requirement that the federal
interest be an element of every prosecution because the commerce element was
part of the firearm statute. The Court's task in Bass was limited to interpreting
the scope of that element, and its reference to the potential effect of the provision
on the federal-state balance supported its statutory interpretation for a provision
almost completely lacking evidence of congressional intent. Reading Bass to
impose a constitutional limitation that federal criminal laws cannot reach certain
types of conduct because they are already subject to state
prosecution-regardless of congressional authority to adopt the
provision-means that the Court would have effectively restored an aspect of
166. The "plain statement rule" asserted in Bass does not operate to limit
congressional authority to adopt a statute. Instead, it is a rule of statutory construction
that imposes a requirement on Congress to make it clear that the scope of the statute is
to alter the balance between the authority of the federal government and the states. See
Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 787 (2000)
("'[T]he ordinary rule of statutory construction' that 'if Congress intends to alter the
usual constitutional balance between States and the Federal Government, it must make
its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."') (quoting Will
v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)). The criminal statute at issue in
Bass did not change the balance between the federal government and the states because
the states retained the authority to prosecute crimes to the same extent as before the
adoption of the federal statute. Moreover, a federal prosecution would have no effect on
a prior or subsequent state prosecution under the Double Jeopardy Clause, so there is no
way in which the states were displaced or affected by the federal law.
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Hammer it rejected in Darby, that the federal criminal law should not intrude
upon certain areas that are of "purely local" concern.'67
The issue of constitutional limitations on congressional authority to adopt
criminal laws, and the relation between the national and state governments in the
prosecution of crimes, was largely dormant for two decades after Perez and Bass.
The broad endorsement of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause
in Perez gave the impression that few, if any, areas were beyond the reach of
federal legislation, at least until the Court took a more restrictive view of what
constitutes commerce in Lopez.
D. Making Sense Out of Federalism Limits on Criminal Statutes
Neither Bass nor the Court's more recent decisions in Lopez and Morrison
addressed how to avoid interference with state authority outside of the limitations
on Congress's enumerated powers. Bass noted that a broader interpretation of
a criminal statute that permitted prosecution without reference to the effect on
commerce might have presented constitutional problems, but that was dictum to
support the Court's exercise in statutory interpretation. Lopez and Morrison
raised concerns about the validity of federal criminal statutes that reached
conduct traditionally subject to prosecution by the states, but that was not the
principle basis for those decisions, which were largely concerned with
determining the proper scope of the Commerce Clause.
The reference in Morrison to the "distinction between what is truly national
and what is truly local" harkened back to the Court's early dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence and the "dual sovereignty" approach of Hammer v.
Dagenhart regarding "matters purely local." The concept of federalism as
167. In Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000), decided shortly after
Morrison, the Court relied on Bass as a basis for its interpretation of the federal arson
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000), that required the government to prove that the property
be involved in commerce at the time of the burning. The statute reached arson of any
building "used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or
foreign commerce," and the government argued that the private residence affected
interstate commerce because, inter alia, it was used to obtain a mortgage from an out-of-
state lender and received natural gas from another state. The Court stated "[t]o read §
844(i) as encompassing the arson of an owner-occupied private home would effect such
a change [on the federal-state balance], for arson is a paradigmatic common-law state
crime." Id. at 858. The Court did not explain how the broader reading of the federal
crime would "significantly change[] the federal-state balance" merely by reaching a
common law offense subject to state prosecution. Id. Much as it did in Bass, the Court
relied on the federalism concern to read the interstate commerce element of the offense
narrowly to require proof that the crime directly affected interstate commerce. See
United States v. Ballinger, 312 F.3d 1264 (1 th Cir. 2002) (applying the Court's analysis
in Jones to hold that 18 U.S.C. Section 247, prohibiting arson of religious property,
should be construed narrowly to require a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
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creating distinct spheres of federal and state authority meant that the Constitution
might impose an external constraint on congressional authority to adopt statutes
that reach areas subject to the exclusive control of the states. The problem with
that understanding is that the Court has never provided a coherent analysis,
outside of the anti-commandeering cases, of how federalism can be an
independent limit on the authority of Congress to enact criminal laws.
Criminal statutes permit the executive branch to prosecute defendants, and
there is no conscription of any state officer to promote or enforce the federal
law. 6 Indeed, the opposite was the case in Lopez and Morrison, the problem
being that the federal statute operated in an area in which the states traditionally
prosecuted offenses but where in fact the federal government chose, for whatever
reason, to pursue criminal charges.' 69 Morrison's reference to conduct that is
"truly local" and the maintenance of the federal-state balance in adopting
criminal laws is misleading because it ignored the Court's longstanding
approach, reaffirmed in Darby when it overruled Hammer. Under that approach,
the validity of federal criminal laws does not depend on the subject matter of the
prohibition because they do not displace the police power of the states or affect
the states' ability to enforce criminal laws. 70
The Court's decisions in Lopez and Morrison failed to make clear how
federalism restrains the authority of the national government to enforce federal
criminal laws, except as a principle of statutory construction or a guide to the
limits of the enumerated powers. Unfortunately, reference to what is "truly
national" and "truly local" indicated that a case might involve an "as-applied"
constitutional violation of federalism if the prosecution involves conduct that is
truly local, thereby invading the sovereignty of the states. Thus, Lopez and
Morrison created the impression that the Constitution fashioned distinct spheres
of authority that the national government may not traverse in a particular
prosecution, regardless of whether a particular law itself was a proper exercise
of congressional authority.
168. See United States v. Jones, 231 F.3d 508, 515 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting
defendant's constitutional challenge under Printz to a provision of the federal firearms
law because "[t]he statute at issue here is a federal criminal statute to be implemented by
federal authorities; it does not attempt to force the states or state officers to enact or
enforce any federal regulation").
169. See Klein, supra note 18, at 1556 (discussing the author's conversation with
the Assistant United States Attorney assigned to the Lopez prosecution who stated that
his office took the case from state prosecutors because of political pressure for a federal
prosecution).
170. See Klein, supra note 18, at 1550 ("The Court accomplishes little when it
intervenes to protect the states from duplicative federal legislation."); Massey, supra note
103, at 475 ("There is simply no indiction that the Court is poised to undermine
Champion v. Ames or any other chestnuts of this genre.") (footnote omitted).
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As a result, some lower courts have misread the Supreme Court's references
to federalism in Lopez and Morrison and appear to believe that they authorize a
type of judicial supervisory authority for federal courts to police prosecutors if
the court believes the subject of the prosecution does not include a sufficient
national interest. This conception of federalism operates not only as a limitation
on Congress, but also as a new basis for a "chancellor's foot veto" to be
exercised by the lower courts to block federal prosecutions, a power that is far
beyond the meaning of federalism.
IV. MISGUIDED FEDERALISM AS A LIMITATION ON INDIVIDUAL
PROSECUTIONS
Many federal statutes require proof of an element that reflects the
constitutional basis for the offense. For example, the Hobbs Act prohibits
robbery or extortion that "in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects
commerce,"' 17 1 and courts interpret the provision to rely on the fullest extent of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause.77 The Mail Fraud statute
requires proof that, for the purpose of executing a fraudulent scheme, the
defendant "places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any
matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service,"'7 an
exercise of congressional authority under the Postal Clause.17 Other provisions,
however, such as the prohibition on illegal gambling, do not require proof of any
element that relates to the constitutional power under which Congress enacted
the statute.1
7 1
171. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2000).
172. See United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415,420-21 (1956) ("It is also stated in
the opinion below that to interpret the Act as covering the activity charged would 'extend
the jurisdiction of the Court, and the power of Congress beyond their Constitutional
limits.' The same language is in the order. Since in our view the legislation is directed
at the protection of interstate commerce against injury from extortion, the court's holding
is clearly wrong. We said in the Local 807 case that racketeering affecting interstate
commerce was within federal legislative control.") (citation omitted).
173. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
174. A violation of the Mail Fraud statute may also involve the use of "any private
or commercial interstate carrier," which is based on the Commerce Clause and not the
Postal Clause. See Henning, supra note 129, at 469 (discussing the constitutional basis
in the Commerce Clause of the interstate carrier amendment to the Mail Fraud statute).
The Wire Fraud statute, which covers the same types of fraudulent conduct as the Mail
Fraud statute, is also an exercise of the commerce power, requiring proof of a
transmission by "wire, radio or television communication in interstate or foreign
commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000).
175. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (2000). The gambling offense is defined as follows:
"Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an
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In Lopez, the Supreme Court noted that the presence of a "jurisdictional
element . . . would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearms
possession in question affects interstate commerce. ' 76 The jurisdictional
element is not constitutionally required, but it provides some measure of comfort
that the particular prosecution embodies the interests of the national
government. 77 Statutes that require proof of a federal jurisdictional element
permit courts to police prosecutions by determining whether the federal
government introduced sufficient proof of that element of the offense. It is not
uncommon, for example, that the government fails to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt the requisite effect on interstate commerce or the mailing
element, and a court will reverse a conviction on the ground of insufficient
evidence of that jurisdictional element of the offense. 7 The problem in that
illegal gambling business shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both." Id. Courts have rejected constitutional challenges to the provision based
on Lopez and Morrison because the statutes are directed at commercial activity. See
United States v. Riddle, 249 F.3d 529, 539 (6th Cir. 2001).
176. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,561 (1995). The civil liabilityprovision
of the Violence Against Women Act at issue in Morrison also did not contain a
jurisdictional element requiring proof of an effect on interstate commerce, but the
criminal provisions of the Act require proof of interstate travel in the commission of the
offense. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261-62 (2000).
177. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000) (holding that
federal arson statute did not reach arson of every building that has any effect on interstate
commerce to avoid "the constitutional question that would arise were we to read § 844(i)
to render the 'traditionally local criminal conduct' in which petitioner Jones engaged 'a
matter for federal enforcement"') (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350
(197 1)); United States v. McLemore, 28 F.3d 1160, 1164-65 (11 th Cir. 1994) (dismissing
indictment under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(h) prohibiting the knowing transfer of a firearm
to be used in a crime of violence because the law did not include violations of state laws
only and Congress did not meet the requirements of the plain statement rule showing that
it intended to alterthe federal-state balance); accord United States v. Acosta, 124 F. Supp.
2d 631 (E.D. Wisc. 2000).
178. See, e.g., Jones, 529 U.S. at 859 (building involved in arson was a private
residence and did not meet the requirement that property be used in interstate commerce);
Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1960) (proof of Hobbs Act commerce
element at trial differed impermissibly from what was charged in the indictment, so
government failed to prove element of the offense charged and the conviction was
reversed); United States v. Odom, 252 F.3d 1289, 1297 (11 th Cir. 2001) (reversing arson
conviction involving burning of a church because the government failed to prove that the
building was used for commercial activity); United States v. Hannigan, 27 F.3d 890, 895
(3rd Cir. 1994) (reversing mail fraud conviction because there was insufficient evidence
that mails were used when witness did not have personal knowledge of routine business
practices of company that allegedly mailed the matter).
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instance is not a constitutional one, but the more rudimentary issue of meeting
the government's high burden of proof in a criminal case.'79
The Supreme Court's invocation of federalism in Lopez and Morrison as a
potential limit on the national government's authority raises the question whether
courts can prohibit federal prosecutions even if the government provided
sufficient proof of a jurisdictional element or a jurisdictional element is not
explicitly required. If federalism can be applied as an independent constitutional
constraint to prohibit individual federal prosecutions of conduct involving
matters that are "truly local," regardless of whether the statute has ajurisdictional
element, then the Court has effectively created a constitutional requirement that
the government prove in every case that the charges involve subjects of national
importance or the prosecution cannot proceed in federal court. This appraoch
misreads the meaning of federalism because that principle does not empower
courts to rewrite statutes or condition the enforcement of federal criminal laws
on ajudge's particular perception of what cases are in the interest of the federal
government to prosecute.
A. Facial and As-Applied Constitutional Challenges
When a defendant challenges the constitutionality of a statute, the
traditional view is that a court generally should consider only the validity of the
statute as applied in the particular case. In United States v. Salerno,' the
Supreme Court stated, "A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the
most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid."' 8 A facial challenge seeking to have the law declared unconstitutional
without regard to its particular application to the claimant's circumstances,
therefore, is viewed with suspicion, at least if one accepts at face value
Salerno's blanket assertion.
The only type of facial challenge explicitly recognized by the Court
involves a claim of overbreadth-that a statute impermissibly infringes on the
First Amendment right of free speech.'82 The overbreadth doctrine permits a
179. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 236 F.3d 848, 855 (7th Cir. 2001)
(reversing Hobbs Act conviction arising from theft of marijuana because the
government's proof of the effect on interstate commerce was "too attenuated to establish
that [the victim] ran an interstate business. To render a guilty verdict, the jury must hear
sufficient evidence to avoid resorting to excessively strained inferences or guesswork.").
180. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
181. Id. at 745. Salerno involved a challenge to the pre-trial detention provision
of the Bail Reform Act on the ground that it violated the Due Process Clause and the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive bail.
182. Id. ("The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate unconstitutionally under
some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since
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party to claim that a statute is facially unconstitutional because it reaches speech
otherwise protected by the First Amendment, even if the party's own speech
might not be protected.' The Court is misleading, however, when it asserts that
overbreadth is the only exception to the general requirement that all other
constitutional challenges must be considered only as applied to the litigant.
Scholars point to many instances outside of the overbreadth doctrine in which the
Court has held a statute unconstitutional on its face.
Professor Monaghan discussed another type of facial challenge, the "valid
rule" claim, that "a litigant always had the right to be judged in accordance with
a constitutionally valid rule of law. Put differently, a litigant could make a facial
challenge to the constitutional sufficiency of the rule actually applied to him,
irrespective of the privileged character of his own activity." '84 Professor
Monaghan's insight was that any as-applied challenge presumed that the rule
being applied was within the power of the legislature to adopt the provision, and
that if the legislature could not have adopted the law, then the Constitution
prohibits any application of the statute to any person subject to government
regulation.18 ' Although scholars disagree about the basic nature of constitutional
claims-whether as-applied and facial claims are really separate categories or
different ways of viewing the litigant's claim of constitutional infirmity 8 -they
we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment.").
183. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense ofOverbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853,
863 (1991) ("When speech or expressive activity forms a significant part of a law's
target, the law is subject to facial challenge and invalidation if: (i) it is 'substantially
overbroad'-that is, if its illegitimate applications are too numerous 'judged in relation
to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep,' and (ii) no constitutionally adequate narrowing
construction suggests itself." (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,615 (1973))
(footnote omitted); Note, The FirstAmendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV.
844, 845 (1970) ("The newer and more aggressive method of reviewing overbroad laws
on their face involves scrutiny to determine whether a statute is too sweeping in
coverage-and if so, invalid on its face. Such review proceeds without regard to the
constitutional status of a particular complainant's conduct.") (footnote omitted).
184. Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 3.
185. See id. at 8 ("Thus, in addition to a claim of privilege, a litigant has always
been permitted to make another, equally 'conventional' challenge: He can insist that his
conduct be judged in accordance with a rule that is constitutionally valid.... In sharp
contrast to a fact-dependent privilege claim, a challenge to the content of the rule applied
independent of the specific facts of the litigant's predicament.").
186. See Matthew D. Adler, Rights, Rules, and the Structure of Constitutional
Adjudication: A Response to Professor Fallon, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1371, 1387 (2000)
("At best, there is a distinction between 'facial' and 'as-applied' challenges that comes
in at the remedial stage, but this is more aptly phrased as a distinction between facial
invalidation (where the court completely repeals an invalid rule) and partial invalidation
(where the court amends, rather than repeals, an invalid rule)."); Matthew D. Adler,
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are unanimous that every party subject to government regulation can assert a
right to be judged by a law that is a valid exercise of the government's authority
to enact and enforce the provision.'87
The Constitution, therefore, prohibits application of a rule that is not a valid
exercise of the government's authority. Thus, the valid rule claim is not that the
Constitution explicitly protects a litigant's conduct, but that the regulation the
government seeks to enforce is beyond its authority. The statute would be
unconstitutional on its face because it cannot be applied in any permissible
manner, regardless of whether the litigant's conduct would have violated the
provision. Unlike an overbreadth claim, which rests on the proposition that
some, but not all, applications of the statute will impinge on free speech rights,
the valid rule challenge posits that the provision cannot be applied in any
situation because the legislature did not have the authority to adopt the provision
in the first place.'
The valid rule requirement is inherent in the legal structure created by the
Constitution, although it is not identifiable in the constitutional text. The rule is
not the subject of separate judicial analysis, as Professor Fallon noted: "[I]t is
hard to identify direct judicial affirmations of the valid rule requirement, though
a doctrinal home could easily be found in the Due Process Clause: due process
Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure ofAmerican Constitutional Law, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 12 (1998) ("The essential function of constitutional courts is to assess rules
against these kinds of moral tests, and to repeal or amend those rules that are moral
failures."); Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 235,294 (1994) ("The distinction between as-applied and facial challenges may
confuse more than it illuminates. In some sense, any constitutional challenge to a statute
is both as-applied and'facial.") (footnote omitted); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Appliedand
Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2000)
("[I]t is more misleading than informative to suggest that 'facial challenges' constitute
a distinct category of constitutional litigation. Rather, facial challenges and invalidations
are best conceptualized as incidents or outgrowths of as-applied litigation.").
187. See Fallon, Jr., supra note 186, at 1327 ("In a nutshell, everyone has a
personal right, independent of third-party standing, to challenge the enforcement of a
constitutionally invalid statute against her.").
188. See Fallon, Jr., supra note 186, at 1332 ("If the statute under which a
defendant is convicted is invalid-for example, because it prohibits 'fighting words' on
too narrow and discriminatory a basis-the defendant's conviction must be reversed for
the sole and simple reason that there is no constitutionally valid rule of law under which
the defendant could be sanctioned (even though there is no general right to utter fighting
words)."); Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid
Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 408 (1998) ("Because valid rule facial
challenges take place at the level of statutory rules and constitutional requirements and
predicate the claim of facial invalidity on an inherent constitutional defect invalidating
all conceivable applications, they are largely unaffected by matters of statutory
severability, whether presumptive or actual.").
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forbids sanctions unless a defendant had fair notice of a valid rule of law."'" 9
This understanding of the scope of enforceable laws can be traced to the seminal
decision in Marbury v. Madison,9' when the Court held that "a law repugnant
to the constitution is void."'' The Court reiterated that view recently in Alden
v. Maine,'92 an Eleventh Amendment case, when it stated that the Supremacy
Clause only permits federal law to displace state law when the federal provision
"is a valid exercise of the national power."' 93 In Printz, the Court described the
provision at issue as an "ultra vires congressional action," and, therefore,
"'merely [an] ac[t] of ursurpation' which 'deserve[s] to be treated as such."" 94
Unless the legislature validly enacted a rule, the Court treats the law as a nullity,
subject to no further consideration, much less enforcement.
Lopez and Morrison are quintessential examples of the Court declaring the
statutes facially unconstitutional, and, therefore, inapplicable to the defendants'
conduct, because they failed the valid rule requirement.'" The defendants did
not assert that the statutes violated their personal constitutional rights, such as the
right to trial by jury, or that their conduct was somehow privileged from
prosecution. Far from it, the defendant in Lopez clearly violated the Gun-Free
School Zones Act and the procedural posture of Morrison required the Court to
accept the plaintiffs allegations of rape as true. The Court found the statutes
unconstitutional because Congress did not have the power under the Commerce
Clause to enact regulations for what the Court determined were noncommercial
189. Fallon, Jr., supra note 186, at 1333.
190. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
191. Id. at 180; see Dorf, supra note 186, at 247 ("Under this view, now canonized
in American law, the very meaning of an enforceable constitution is that an
unconstitutional law may not be enforced.").
192. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
193. Id. at 731.
194. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton)).
195. Recent scholarship discussing the valid rule requirement largely ignores the
federalism decisions of the past decade. In those cases, the Court did not engage in any
form of as-applied constitutional analysis to determine whether the particular prosecution
or civil claim violated a right of the defendants, or whether the statute violated the
sovereignty of a state in a particular circumstance. The underlying facts of the cases are
almost completely irrelevant to the ultimate decision invalidating the provisions, and in-
the anti-commandeering cases there was no issue of fact, only whether Congress could
regulate the states in the manner chosen. In Lopez and Morrison, both of which involved
factual questions, the Court's focus was on congressional authority to reach the category
of conduct that was the subject of the provisions: possession of a weapon and rape. It
is not clear why the scholarship in this area has not used the federalism and Commerce
Clause decisions as a vehicle to demonstrate the importance of the valid rule requirement
when the Court clearly decided facial challenges without regard to whether the provision
was unconstitutional as applied.
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activities-i.e., the statutes were not valid rules-so the provisions could not be
the basis to sanction the defendants, regardless of the impropriety of their
conduct.
The Commerce Clause, like the other enumerated powers, incorporates a
structural requirement that Congress act pursuant to a constitutional grant of
authority. Similarly, federalism protects the sovereignty of the states by limiting
the federal government's regulatory authority to areas permitted by the
Constitution. Federalism protects the liberty of all by constraining the power of
the national government to act in only those areas that the Constitution
recognizes through the enumerated powers. In that sense, everyone shares the
constitutional right to challenge an act of Congress or administrative regulation
that is "ultra vires" and, therefore, beyond the scope of the federal government's
power. 96 Along the lines that Professor Adler suggests, the enumerated powers
provided in the Constitution permit a challenge alleging that the federal
government lacks the authority to regulate a particular subject or to do so in a
particular manner, but the grant of authority does not protect any particular
conduct from permissible congressional regulation.'97
If challenges to congressional authority to enact a statute in reality seek the
facial invalidation of the provision, because every litigant has the right to be
sanctioned only under a valid rule, can there also be an as-applied challenge on
the same ground? In other words, if federalism limits congressional authority to
enact regulations on particular subjects, then can that same constitutional
limitation be applied on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the
application of a regulation to specific conduct comports with the limitations
imposed by the Constitution? The answer would appear to be yes, simply
because as-applied challenges are the favored method for alleging a
constitutional violation, as described by Salerno. Yet, as-applied challenges
involve the assertion of an individual's right to be free from government
regulation of certain activities, such as protected expression or religious exercise,
196. See, e.g., United States v. Sabri, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1158 (D. Minn. 2002),
rev'd, No. 02-1561, 2003 WL 1792150 (8th Cir. Apr. 7, 2003) (dismissing indictment
upon finding that 18 U.S.C. Section 666, a federal anti-bribery statute, was facially
unconstitutional because Congress did not have the power to adopt the statute under the
Spending Clause); Dorf, supra note 186, at 248-49 ("The Constitution does not create,
in so many words, an individual right to be judged only by a constitutional law. But the
Constitution certainly forbids a court from enforcing an unconstitutional law. Courts,
which will not enforce unconstitutional laws, will treat litigants exactly as though they
have a right to bejudged only by constitutional rules of law. In practice, therefore, every
litigant does have such a right.").
197. See Adler, supra note 186, at 3 ("A constitutional right protects the rights-
holder from a particular rule (a rule with the wrong predicate or history); it does not
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or a claim that the government's actions did not comport with a specific
constitutional protection afforded to individuals, such as the right to trial by jury
or Miranda warnings. Unlike the valid rule requirement, which focuses solely
on whether the regulation meets the requirements for a constitutionally proper
enactment, as-applied challenges are an assertion of a right held by the
individual, on the assumption that the statute applied is a valid rule.
While the Court describes federalism as a mechanism to protect liberty, it
is not a right held by individuals in the same way that the Bill of Rights provides
certain specific guarantees that individuals can assert. 98 Some lower federal
courts, however, read Lopez and Morrison as giving the judiciary a mandate to.
review individual prosecutions to ensure that there is no violation of what
Morrison called the constitutional "distinction between what is truly national and
what is truly local." The Supreme Court described federalism as a means to
ensure liberty, which is the type of language associated with individual
constitutional rights, and in Salerno the Court asserted that constitutional
challenges are limited to as-applied claims unless First Amendment rights are
implicated. The logic seems inexorable, therefore, that federalism must be
available for an as-applied claim if it is designed to protect the liberty of
individuals from the improper assertion of authority of the federal government.
With no Supreme Court analysis about how federalism should be applied,
lower courts have asserted their authority to enforce the permissible line on a
case-by-case basis, engaging in a type of ad hoc review of individual
prosecutions to ensure that the proceeding involves a matter that is "truly
national."' 99 That approach reflects a significant misunderstanding of the type
of constitutional challenge asserted in Lopez and Morrison when, despite
references to federalism, the Supreme Court only interpreted the scope of the
Commerce Clause to determine that the statutes were not valid rules, but did not
create a new form of federalism analysis for individual prosecutions.
B. Can There Be As-Applied Federalism?
In United States v. McCormack,"°° a federal district court dismissed an
indictment involving the payment of a $4,000 bribe to a local police officer to
prevent an investigation of the defendant's illegal activities. The government
198. See Dorf, supra note 186, at 269 ("[T]he Ninth and Tenth Amendments do
not expressly recognize any rights at all.").
199. See, e.g., United States v. Nutall, 180 F.3d 182, 190 (5th Cir. 1999) (DeMoss,
J., specially concurring) ("Under the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez,
the federal courts are charged with the task of drawing a line between criminal conduct
which is 'truly local' and criminal conduct which is 'truly national' in effect.") (citation
omitted).
200. 31 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D. Mass. 1998).
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charged the defendant under Section 666, a statutory provision that prohibits
bribery of state and local officials employed by programs that receive more than
$10,000 of federal funds in a twelve-month period. An additional element of the
offense requires proof that the value of the payment exceeded $5,000.2o' The
district court expressed serious doubts about whether the payments to the officer
met the statutory requirement of a bribe valued over $5,000, and whether there
was a sufficient connection between the misconduct and the federal funds
received by the local government. The district court could have dismissed the
indictment on either statutory ground. It decided, however, to reach the
perceived federalism issue arising from the prosecution of a local official for a
violation already covered by state criminal law. The district court relied on
Lopez and New York to hold that "whatever other application of Section 666 may
be constitutional, this one is not."2"2
201. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000):
(a) Whoever, if the circumstance described in subsection (b) of this section
exists-
(I) being an agent of an organization, or of a State, local, or Indian tribal
government, or any agency thereof-
(A) embezzles, steals, obtains by fraud, or otherwise without authority
knowingly converts to the use of any person other than the rightful
owner or intentionally misapplies, property that-
(i) is valued at $5,000 or more, and
(ii) is owned by, or is under the care, custody, or control of such organization,
government, or agency; or
(B) corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any person, or accepts or
agrees to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be
influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or
series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency
involving any thing of value of $5,000 or more; or
(2) corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give anything of value to any person,
with intent to influence or reward an agent of an organization or of a
State, local or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof, in
connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of
such organization, government, or agency involving any thing of value
of $5,000 or more; shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more
than 10 years, or both.
(b) The circumstance referred to in subsection (a) of this section is that the
organization, government, or agency receives, in any one year period,
benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a
grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of
Federal assistance.
202. McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 187. It was unclear why the district court
eschewed the statutory grounds in dismissing the indictment. The scope of Section 666
troubled the court, but rather than rely on Bass to read the statute narrowly, the court
never cited that decision or provided any definitive statutory interpretation of the
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The district court in McCormack was troubled by the application of a
federal law to what the court viewed as a matter of petty corruption, noting at
one point that under a broad interpretation of the statute, "[T]he law could make
it a federal crime to offer $20 to a local traffic cop in order to avoid a $50
ticket."2 °3 The district court did not analyze the constitutionality of Section 666
as a valid rule, presuming that it was a proper exercise of congressional authority
under the Spending Power.2" 4 The constitutional violation, therefore, occurred
when the federal prosecutors filed a case involving local corruption that was
unrelated to the federal government's interests.20 5
The Sixth Circuit accepted a similar as-applied federalism challenge to a
prosecution for violation of a federal child pornography statute in United States
v. Corp.2 6 The statute required proof that the visual depiction "was produced
using materials which have been mailed or so shipped or transported" in
interstate commerce. 2 7 To meet this element, the government established that
the photographic paper used for the depictions came from Germany. The Sixth
Circuit dismissed the indictment, holding that while the statute was proper under
the Commerce Clause, the prosecution did not show that the defendant's activity
"would substantially affect interstate commerce."2 8 Although the government
met its burden of proof to establish all the elements of the crime-including the
commerce element-the circuit court overturned the conviction because "Corp
provision to avoid the constitutional problem. As the Supreme Court emphasized in
Bass, the concern with the federal-state balance was to avoid a constitutional issue, not
to highlight it as a step toward dismissing a charge on constitutional grounds.
203. Id. at 183.
204. Id. at 186. The district court did not consider whether the authority for
enacting Section 666 required a different constitutional analysis from Lopez's Commerce
Clause analysis. While federalism informs the scope of the commerce power, it does not
have the same limiting effect on the federal government's authority to spend and adopt
legislation related to that exercise of power. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203
(1990).
205. McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 189 ("Clearly the conduct at issue
here-bribing a local police officer to prevent further investigation and/or prosecution
for state crimes-is not 'related to a legitimate national problem' because it is not
directed towards protecting the integrity of federal funds given to the Malden police
department or even to the programs those funds were intended to support."). Federalism
challenges are not limited to criminal prosecutions, and can be raised in civil regulatory
actions. See, e.g., United States v. Olin, 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1533 (S.D. Ala. 1996)
("EPA's attempt in this case to apply CERCLA liability against the defendant would
exceed the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause."), rev'd, 107 F.3d 1506,
1510 (11 th Cir. 1997) (CERCLA "remains valid as applied in this case because it
regulates a class of activities that substantially affects interstate commerce.").
206. 236 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001).
207. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2000).
208. Corp, 236 F.3d at 333.
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was not the typical offender feared by Congress that [sic] would become
addicted to pornography and perpetuate the industry via interstate
connections."2 °9
Like McCormack, the Sixth Circuit was troubled by the application of a
federal criminal law in an area at the outer limits of congressional authority
involving conduct that had only a slight impact on interstate commerce. The
Corp court imposed a new requirement for a federal prosecution, based on its
view of the requirements of federalism, that permitted it to dismiss the charge
because the defendant's "activity was not of a type demonstrated substantially
to be connected or related to interstate commerce." 10 The court's ad hoc review
meant that federal judges were making the ultimate decision whether the
prosecution merited the exercise of federal authority, a decision usually left to
the executive branch to determine how to vindicate the interests of the national
government. The Sixth Circuit did not reverse the conviction because the statute
was an invalid rule under the Commerce Clause, but on the assertion of its
authority to protect the principle of federalism by declaring that the federal
prosecutors went beyond what the appellate judges perceived was the boundary
between federal and state authority.
Relying on Corp, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. McCoy,"' declared
that all prosecutions involving intrastate possession of child pornography that did
not involve any commercial exchange or offer of sale were unconstitutional as
applied. The defendant possessed a single picture that violated the statute, and
the government introduced sufficient evidence to meet the explicit commerce
element of the provision. Purporting to apply Morrison, the Ninth Circuit found
that "[tihe kind of demonstrable and substantial relationship required between
intrastate activity and interstate commerce is utterly lacking here." Without that
evidence, the court held that "simple interstate possession is not, by itself, either
commercial or economic in nature," and, therefore, "as applied to McCoy and
others similarly situated, § 2252(a)(4)(B) cannot be upheld as a valid exercise of
the Commerce Clause power."2"' The court did not explain why Morrison
permitted it to impose this additional element, which appeared to require the
government to introduce proof of the impact of the defendant's activity in the
particular instance to establish the propriety of the exercise of the commerce
power before it could uphold the prosecution. Circuit Judge Trott dissented on
209. Id. The statute did not require proof of any "substantial" effect on interstate
commerce, and it is unclear where the Sixth Circuit found the authority to rewrite a duly
enacted federal law.
210. Id.
211. No. 01-50495, 2003 WL 1343642 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2003).
212. Id. at ** 14-15. The court rejected the analogy to Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942), because "McCoy's photograph is much farther removed from interstate
activity than Filbum's wheat." Id. at *7.
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the ground that his "colleagues may have exceeded what the law permits. They
have rendered an opinion on the validity of the statute 'as applied,' but I do not
believe they have that option."2"3 In McCoy, the court took it upon itself to
rewrite the statute to comport with its view of what specific types of conduct
Congress should have outlawed under its commerce power.2"4
The Eleventh Circuit used similarly misleading language in construing the
applicability of a federal religious property arson statute in United States v.
Ballinger.2"5 The court found that the evidence of the effect on interstate
commerce was insufficient to sustain a conviction under the commerce element
of the statute. Yet, the court phrased its conclusion in terms of finding that the
statute was unconstitutional as applied, and the opinion concluded by noting that
application of the statute to the defendant's conduct would be "to obliterate the
distinction between national and local authority that undergirds our federal
system of government." '216 If there was insufficient evidence of an element of the
offense, then reference to a constitutional ground for invalidating the conviction
was wholly unnecessary.
A district court made a similar misstatement of the analysis in United States
v. Rayborn,' 7 when it dismissed an indictment for arson of a church under the
same statute because application of the statute in the case "would be an
unconstitutional extension of Congress's commerce power."2 ' The court's
decision had nothing to do with the scope of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause, and instead rested on the finding that the government did not
have sufficient proof to establish the commerce element of the offense, which
requires proof that the building was used in an activity affecting interstate
commerce. The insufficiency of the government's proof means that a conviction
cannot be entered under the Due Process Clause, which requires proof of each
213. Id. at *23 (Trott, J., dissenting). Circuit Judge Trott argued that the majority
effectively declared the statute unconstitutional because "[tihe upshot of condemning the
statute 'as applied' is either (1) tantamount to condemning the statute, hic sepultus, on
its face as overbroad, or (2) construing the statute as the Supreme Court did in Jones as
not covering intrastate non-commercial possession." Id.
214. The McCoy majority asserted that "[i]f punishment for the conduct in which
McCoy engaged is desirable and lawful, it is the state that must seek to attain that result,
not the federal government." Id. at *15. The court did not declare the statute
unconstitutional because of the possible violation of federalism, as the Supreme Court
did in Lopez and Morrison, but rather asserted "[t]he statute is unconstitutional as
applied." Id. The Ninth Circuit never explained why it did not declare the statute
unconstitutional on its face, perhaps wishing to avoid having to draw the line between
permissible and impermissible applications of the commerce power.
215. 312 F.3d 1264 (llth Cir. 2002).
216. Id. at 1276.
217. 138 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (W.D. Tenn. 2001).
218. Id. at 1031.
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element beyond a reasonable doubt, but that insufficiency is irrelevant to whether
the statute is a valid exercise of congressional authority.
In United States v. Garcia,"9 the district court confused statutory
interpretation with the scope of federalism in dismissing a charge under the
Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity ("VCAR") statute largely
because the murder at issue was "still, in the end, a street crime committed by a
thug as part of a local turf war in southwest Detroit."22' The VCAR
charge-which permitted the federal prosecutors to seek the death
penalty-required proof of a violent act for the purpose of gaining admission to
or maintaining a position in a criminal enterprise.22' The only commerce element
in the indictment related to federal jurisdiction over the criminal enterprise under
RICO in a separate count; VCAR did not require the government to prove a
separate effect on commerce from the violent act. The district court found that
the absence of a separate commerce element for VCAR pushed "too far against
the strictures of Lopez," but did not declare the statute itself unconstitutional.222
Instead, the district court held that the indictment did not allege sufficient
jurisdictional facts "to withstand an as-applied challenge to" VCAR.223
The absence of a jurisdictional element might have provided a basis for
declaring VCAR facially unconstitutional as an invalid rule under Lopez. The
district court, however, relied only on the insufficiency of the facts alleged in the
indictment showing a federal interest in the underlying crime to find the
prosecution-but not the statute-unconstitutional because the government
failed to establish the federal interest in a local crime of violence. The district
court misread Lopez as establishing a separate pleading requirement beyond what
a particular statute may require, a type of additional constitutional element for
219. 68 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
220. Id. at 811.
221. 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) (2000):
Whoever, as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise
or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value from an enterprise engaged
in racketeering activity, or for the purpose of gaining entrance to or
maintaining or increasing position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering
activity, murders, kidnaps, maims, assaults with a dangerous weapon,
commits assault resulting in serious bodily injury upon, or threatens to
commit a crime of violence against any individual in violation of the laws of
any State or the United States, or attempts or conspires so to do, shall be
punished.
222. Garcia, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 812. Three circuit courts have rejected
constitutional challenges to VCAR on federalism grounds, finding that the connection
between the enterprise and interstate commerce, and not the act of violence itself, was
sufficient. See United States v. Riddle, 249 F.3d 529, 538 (6th Cir. 2001); United States
v. Mapp, 170 F.3d 328, 336 (2nd Cir. 1999); United States v. Gray, 137 F.3d 765, 773
(4th Cir. 1998).
223. Garcia, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 813.
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a charge that reaches ostensibly local conduct. Rather than determine whether
VCAR was a valid rule under the Commerce Clause, the district court asserted
that there was a constitutional violation in this particular instance because the
government's proof did not reach the level at which the court could declare that
the prosecution involved an issue that was "truly national" and not just
something "truly local." '224 The elements of the crime, and the sufficiency of the
government's proof, do not grant a court the authority to determine whether a
particular prosecution appears to involve conduct that is insufficiently national
to warrant federal involvement.225
C. Federalism and the Constitutional Remedy
The courts that rely on federalism as the basis for declaring an individual
prosecution unconstitutional never discuss the source of that authority-beyond
quotations from Lopez and Morrison regarding the distinction between national
and local interests-or how these federalism limits on the executive branch
should be ascertained. The courts refer to the "local" nature of the conduct,
relying on the perception that these types of violations are among those usually
224. Id.
225. A substantial group of judges on the Fifth Circuit have asserted-quite
vehemently-that particular prosecutions violated the Constitution because they involved
purely local crimes brought in the federal courts. In United States v. McFarland, 311
F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam), a case in which the convictions were affirmed by
an equally-divided court sitting en banc, the dissenting judges asserted that Hobbs Act
convictions for robbing local stores were "crimes prototypical of those that historically
have been within the reserved police power of the states, contrary to the principle that the
Commerce Clause is limited to matters that are truly national rather than truly local." Id.
at 409-10 (Garwood, J., dissenting). In United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230 (5th Cir.
1999) (en banc), another affirmance by an equally-divided en banc Fifth Circuit court,
the dissenting judges stated "[w]e believe that the Hobbs Act prosecutions exceeded
Congress's authority" because they involved "purely local robberies." Id. at 231
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Circuit Judge Jolly, in dissent, argued that the child
pornography statute was unconstitutional as applied in a prosecution involving "the
simple local possession of self-generated child pornography in which there is no
suggestion of commercial activity." United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 231 (5th
Cir. 2000) (Jolly, J., dissenting). Circuit Judge DeMoss, dissenting in another Hobbs Act
prosecution involving robberies, asserted that "[s]ooner or later the Supreme Court must
either back down from the principles enunciated in Lopez or rule that the Hobbs Act
cannot be constitutionally applied to local robberies." United States v. Nutall, 180 F.3d
182, 190 (5th Cir. 1999) (DeMoss, J., dissenting). Dissenting judges in the Eleventh
Circuit raised a similar claim about the broad application of the Hobbs Act after Lopez,
arguing that "[t]he majority's holding will result in the federalization of any crime
involving extortion to acquire money." United States v. Kaplan, 171 F.3d 1351, 1358
(1 th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Birch, J., dissenting).
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prosecuted by state and local authorities. The authority of the states to prosecute
the same offense, however, is not relevant to the constitutional analysis of the
authority of Congress to adopt the statutes in the first place because federal
crimes do not displace any state offenses. Except for those areas in which the
federal government has exclusive jurisdiction, it would be surprising if the
federal crimes were not similar to state laws because both the national
government and the states operate against the same common law traditions.
More than the invocation of the national-local distinction as some type of
meaningful basis for the decision, lower federal court reliance on federalism as
the basis for declaring a particular prosecution unconstitutional ignores the
balance of constitutional authority between Congress and the federal judiciary.
In the context of criminal laws, federalism restricts congressional authority to
adopt statutes outside an express grant of authority. Lopez and Morrison did not
invoke federalism as an independent limit on congressional power, as the
Supreme Court did in New York and Printz in applying the anti-commandeering
rule. Instead, the Court used federalism to explain the limits of the Commerce
Clause to reach its conclusion that the statutes at issue were facially
unconstitutional because they did not regulate commercial activity.226
The flaw in the as-applied analysis of federalism claims is that federalism
neither protects specific types of conduct from regulation by the federal
government, nor does it afford individual litigants with any right limiting how
the government can proceed in applying an otherwise valid regulation.227 The
Commerce Clause-or the other enumerated powers-does not provide
individuals with any rights beyond the requirement of a valid rule adopted
pursuant to a legitimate exercise of constitutional authority. Federalism is a
means to protect the sovereignty of the states, so while a particular enactment
may be invalid as beyond the scope of the federal government's power, it does
not permit a defendant to assert a right to prevent application of an otherwise
valid statute to that defendant. While a state may challenge a federal statute
because it invades its sovereignty-the type of claim asserted successfully in
New York and Printz-individuals are only indirectly protected by federalism
through its preservation of the sovereignty of the states. While an individual can
assert that a regulation is facially invalid because the enactment violates the
limitations imposed by federalism, there is no individual right to have the
226. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of
Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEx. L. REv. 1459, 1479 (2001) ("[T]he federal
courts must play backup to Congress, to ensure that any unconstitutional legislation that
emerges from the political process ... will not survive.").
227. See Klein, supra note 18, at 1552 ("This Court-imposed decentralization
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government prove that a particular prosecution comes within the interests of the
national government.
The Supreme Court has never viewed federalism as giving lower courts ad
hoc authority to declare unconstitutional particular instances in which the
executive branch applied the law to cases involving crimes with a strong local
interest. In Hoke v. United States, the Court rejected the defendants' challenge
to the constitutionality of the Mann Act by noting that the issue was one of
congressional authority and not the local nature of the conduct: "If the statute
be a valid exercise of [the commerce] power, how it may affect persons or states
is not material to be considered. It is the supreme law of the land, and persons
and states are subject to it." '228 Justice Holmes made the same point in his
dissenting opinion in Hammer v. Dagenhart, stating that "if an act is within the
power specifically conferred upon Congress, it seems to me that it is not made
any less constitutional because of the indirect effects that it may have, however
obvious it may be that it will have those effects, and that we are not at liberty
upon such grounds to hold it void."229 The Court has consistently viewed the
appropriate remedy when Congress violates the limitations on its power imposed
by federalism to be declaring the statute void due to the constitutional infirmity,
not that the statute as-applied violated the rights of an individual but otherwise
remains enforceable in more acceptable circumstances.23
228. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320 (1913).
229. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
230. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court used federalism to support its narrow
interpretation of the federal statute to avoid any constitutional problems, much as it did
in Bass. In New York and Printz, the Court invalidated the provisions at issue as
violating the constitutional protection of the state afforded by federalism, and those laws
only reached the states and did not seek to regulate the conduct of individuals. In College
Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999),
an Eleventh Amendment case, the Court appeared to invalidate the Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act because Congress did not have the authority to abrogate a state's
sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 675. The Court did not
consider whether the Act might be a permissible exercise of congressional authority in
other situations, a more traditional approach to an as-applied claim of unconstitutionality.
Some lower courts reject as-applied challenges and only review whether the criminal
statute is a proper exercise of congressional authority. See United States v. Faasse, 265
F.3d 475, 479 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (upholding the constitutionality of the Child
Support Recovery Act); United States v. Lewko, 269 F.3d 64, 69 (1st Cir. 2001)
(upholding the constitutionality of the Child Support Recovery Act and noting that "[t]he
defendant's invocation of the uniquely local concerns of family law are inapposite");
United States v. Santiago, 238 F.3d 213, 217 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (upholding the
constitutionality of the federal firearm felon-in-possession statute); United States v.
Grassie, 237 F.3d 1199, 1211 (10th Cir. 2001) (upholding the constitutionality of the
church arson statute); United States v. Angle, 234 F.3d 326, 338 (7th Cir. 2000)
(upholding the constitutionality of the child pornography statute); United States v.
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Courts that consider as-applied challenges miss the point that federalism
only affects whether the statute, and not the particular prosecution, is a valid
exercise of congressional authority, so the analysis need not proceed to a
consideration of whether the facts involved in the prosecution involve a national
or local interest.23 ' The only issue left after analyzing whether Congress had the
authority to enact the statute was whether the government introduced sufficient
proof of all the elements of the crime, which may include an element of the
offense reflecting federal jurisdiction based on the constitutional authority of
Congress, such as an effect on interstate commerce or interstate transportation.
Even when a court conducts the proper inquiry into congressional authority to
adopt the provision, it can still fall into the trap of construing the challenge as
raising the constitutional issue only as applied in the particular prosecution.232
The Court's recent federalism decisions-ranging from New York and Printz to
Lopez and Morrison-uniformly apply the same remedy when Congress exceeds
the scope of its authority by declaring the statute facially unconstitutional.
Federalism has never been a means by which the courts can police individual
prosecutions because it is a principle that informs the relationship between the
federal government, primarily the Congress, and the states. It is by necessity a
vague limitation, subject to the particular circumstances in which Congress
acts.233 It is completely unsuitable as a tool for courts to police federal
prosecutors as a means to determine the line between what is "truly national" and
"truly local."
Lower courts that rely on federalism as granting them the authority to reject
a particular prosecution because it is beyond the power of the federal
Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 399-402 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding the constitutionality of the
federal statute prohibiting possession of a firearm by a person subject to a domestic
violence court order).
231. See United States v. Morris, 247 F.3d 1080, 1087 (10th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e
reject Morris's contention that the Hobbs Act was unconstitutionally applied to him.").
232. See, e.g., United States v. Edgar, 304 F.3d 1320, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting the defendant's facial challenge to the constitutionality of Section 666 as
beyond congressional power under the Spending Clause, and then rejecting the
defendant's "as-applied" challenge to the indictment); United States v. Shaffner, 258
F.3d 675, 683 (7th Cir. 2001) (upholding constitutionality of federal statute on sexual
exploitation of a minor as a proper exercise of the Commerce Clause authority, and then
concluding that "prosecution under § 2251 (a) in this case is a permissible exercise of
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause") (emphasis added).
233. Cf Klein, supra note 90, at 598 ("An ad hoc method of 'I Know It When I See
It' jurisprudence risks turning federalism into a vehicle for judicial preference
enforcement, calling to mind Justice Holmes's criticism of the Lochner-era substantive
due process cases that improperly 'read[] into [the Constitution] conceptions of public
policy that the particular Court may happen to entertain."') (quoting Tyson & Brother-
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government, regardless of the whether the statute is a valid rule, essentially
exercise a new type of supervisory authority over the decisions of federal
prosecutors. It is true that the Supreme Court has recognized a limited judicial
authority to supervise the conduct of litigation for "establishing and maintaining
civilized standards of procedure and evidence." '234 Federal courts have, for
instance, relied on their supervisory power to dismiss indictments because of
perceived misconduct by investigators and prosecutors acting through the grand
jury, even though the misconduct did not violate any constitutional protection
afforded to defendants. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has
substantially curtailed the authority of lower federal courts to impose rules under
the inherent supervisory power for conduct involving the grand jury, restricting
the authority of federal courts to dismiss indictments when there is no violation
of the rights of a defendant."' Similarly, the Court has been cautious about
recognizing a broad due process right to police federal prosecutors for what a
court may term "outrageous government conduct." '236 There is no real distinction
between reviewing prosecutorial practices under the supervisory power or due
process analysis, and the Court has rejected improper interference with the
decisions of federal prosecutors about whether and how to prosecute a case.
237
The application of federalism to prohibit a particular prosecution of an
offense-despite the constitutionality of the statute-because a federal court
deems the conduct to fall within the category of a "truly local" crime has the
hallmark of a standardless judicial authority to assess the propriety of the
234. See United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1217 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e
recognize that there is a danger in the courts transforming a general axiom of federalism
into a rule of decision to determine the outcome of particular cases. A jurisprudence of
undefined 'outer limits' surely would repose too much discretion in the courts.").
235. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36,50 (1992) ("[A]ny power federal
courts may have to fashion, on their own initiative, rules of grandj ury procedure is a very
limited one, not remotely comparable to the power they maintain over their own
proceedings. It certainly would not permitj udicial reshaping of the grand juryinstitution,
substantially altering the traditional relationships between the prosecutor, constituting
court, and the grand jury itself.") (citation omitted); Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial
Misconduct in Grand Jury Investigations, 51 S.C. L. REv. 1, 23 (1999) ("Williams
sounded the deathknell for supervisoryjudicial review ofprosecutorial actions before the
grand jury.")
236. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 n.9 (1980) (Even if the search
was "so outrageous as to offend fundamental 'canons of decency and fairness,' the fact
remains that '[t]he limitations of the Due Process Clause ... come into play only when
the Government activity in question violates some protected right of the defendant.")
(quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952), and Hampton v. United States,
425 U.S. 484, 490 (1975)) (citations omitted).
237. See Henning, supra note 235, at 37 ("Due process and supervisory power are
two sides of the same prosecutorial misconduct coin.").
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decision to prosecute. In United States v. Russell,3 ' then-Justice Rehnquist
warned that the defense of entrapment "was not intended to give the federal
judiciary a 'chancellor's foot' veto over law enforcement practices of which it
did not approve." As-applied federalism provides a new type of chancellor's
foot veto because the principle applied to individual cases is so vague as to defy
definition, depending almost entirely on how the lower court perceives the
relationship between the crime and the national interest. Moreover, such an
application of federalism undermines congressional authority to define the
national interest through the enactment of criminal laws.
If Congress has the authority to adopt a statute, then the Constitution
delegates to the Executive the responsibility to implement that law, consistent
with the constitutional requirements that it be enforced justly and not in violation
of the rights of any individual.239 A judicial declaration that a particular
prosecution violates the tenets of federalism, despite congressional power to
adopt the statute allegedly violated, permits the judicial branch to interfere with
the power of the executive without any of the constitutional safeguards embodied
in the separation of powers. Congress cannot cure any defect in the statute
because it is a wholly proper exercise of its constitutional authority, yet the
courts can prohibit enforcement because a particular instance appears to violate
the court's concepts of federalism.""
238. 411 U.S. 423 (1972).
239. Courts mistakenly use language that equates the analysis of whether the
government has established a violation of a statute with the constitutional issue of
whether Congress has the authority to adopt the provision. For example, in United States
v. Lynch, 282 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit considered a challenge to a
conviction under the Hobbs Act that involved the robbery and murder of an individual.
The circuit court stated that "[w]e therefore must decide whether the Commerce Clause
permits the federal government to exercise jurisdiction over Lynch." Id. at 1052. The
constitutional issue does not involve jurisdiction but whether Congress can adopt the
provision pursuant to its enumerated powers, in this case the Commerce Clause. Lynch
found that the government had not introduced sufficient evidence that the robbery of a
single person and subsequent use of the victim's ATM card in another state to meet the
jurisdictional element of an effect on interstate commerce required for a conviction under
the Hobbs Act. Id. at 1055. That conclusion was not a decision on the constitutional
issue-regardless of the Ninth Circuit's initial assertion-but a determination of the
sufficiency of the government's proof of the elements of the crime. Although often
styled as a constitutional claim under Lopez and Morrison, courts engage in the more
common appellate function of reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence when they
consider the effect on commerce of the defendant's conduct to determine whether the
government met the due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Commerce Clause analysis has nothing to do with that determination, much less the
federalism principle regarding the proper roles of the federal and state governments.
240. The plain statement rule of Bass reflects the position that federalism applies
only to the validity of the congressional enactment and not the particular prosecution.
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V. CONCLUSION
Enforcing federalism as an ad hoc limitation on particular prosecutions that
involve "truly local" crimes means that defendants have a new type of
constitutional defense to a federal charge when the charge involves conduct also
subject to state prosecution. A federalism claim to block a prosecution, such as
that successfully asserted in McCormack, Corp, McCoy, and Garcia, does not
involve an alleged violation of the defendant's constitutional rights, or that the
statute cannot be enforced because Congress lacked the authority to adopt it.
Instead, the claim is that, regardless of the government's proof, the prosecution
is not a proper exercise of the national government's authority. It is a very odd
defense to assert that the federal government cannot convict a defendant for
violating a statute because the national government's interest is insufficient to
permit enforcement of an otherwise valid law. Federalism protects the states
directly, not individuals, from the misuse of authority by the federal government,
so it is hard to understand how it can furnish to an individual a defense to
criminal charges for violating a statute that Congress has the authority to enact.
The decisions in Lopez and Morrison to invalidate the statutory provisions
at issue signaled the proper role of federalism as a principle that supports taking
a limited approach to the scope of congressional authority to exercise one of its
enumerated powers. The national interest must be reflected in the statute, and
the role of the courts is to ensure that Congress adhered to the constitutional
limitations on the authority of the national government. It is an unfortunate
misreading of what the Supreme Court did to invoke federalism as a grant of
independent authority to the federal courts to police the decisions of the
Executive to pursue a particular prosecution under an otherwise valid criminal
statute.
See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159, 174 (2001) ("We thus read the statute as written to avoid the significant
constitutional and federalism questions raised by respondents' interpretation, and
therefore reject the request for administrative deference."). The Court reads the statute
narrowly to avoid reaching the constitutional issue, so that, by implication, if Congress
is sufficiently clear about its intention to expand federal authority, then the provision is
presumably constitutional if Congress in fact has the authority. A particular application
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